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Overcoming the Public-Private Divide in 
Privacy Analogies* 
Victoria Schwartz** 
When a photographer takes unauthorized aerial photographs of a company’s plant, the 
legal framework under which courts evaluate the case, as well as its likely outcome, 
depends on whether the photographer was hired by a private actor or the government. If 
a competitor hired the photographer, the aerial photography may constitute improper 
trade secret misappropriation. If, however, the government hired the photographer, the 
aerial photography would not violate the Fourth Amendment. This dichotomy illustrates 
a public-private divide in which privacy violations by the government are treated 
differently from privacy violations by the private sector. Despite this divide, some courts 
have analogized from the Fourth Amendment to the trade secret context, while the 
Supreme Court has rejected such an analogy in the opposite direction. 
 
A similar but reverse phenomenon occurs in the workplace privacy context. 
Traditionally, whether an employee whose privacy has been invaded by an employer is 
likely to prevail in court depends in part on whether the employer is in the public or 
private sector. The longstanding wisdom is that public-sector employees receive stronger 
workplace privacy protections than similarly situated private-sector employees as a result 
of Fourth Amendment protections. Nonetheless, unlike the trade secret context, Supreme 
Court precedent suggests that private-sector analogies are appropriate in evaluating 
public workplace privacy cases. 
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am writing asking me, “Is this a Puzzle paper or a Problem paper?” 
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School; B.S., B.A., 2004, Stanford University. Thank you to Gregory Boden and Zachary Price for 
excellent research assistance and to Caley Turner for invaluable editorial assistance. I am grateful to 
Paul Secunda, Lior Strahilevitz, and Adam Shinar for providing extensive feedback on earlier drafts. I 
would also like to thank Ryan Calo, Jack Chin, David Han, Michael Helfand, Orin Kerr, Jon Michaels, 
Paul Ohm, Elizabeth Pollman, Greg Reilly, and Sherod Thaxton for their thoughts and comments at 
various stages of the process. Many thanks also to the participants at the Ninth Annual Colloquium on 
Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law, 2014 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, 2014 
Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property, Prawfsfest XI, Pepperdine University School of Law Faculty 
Research Workshop, and Southern California Junior Law Faculty Workshop where I presented earlier 
versions of this Article. 
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Despite this apparent inconsistency, neither courts nor scholars have offered any 
systematic criteria for evaluating when privacy analogies across the public-private divide 
are appropriate. Rather, courts import or reject privacy analogies between the public and 
private sectors without any meaningful consideration of when such analogies make sense. 
This Article offers a coherent and consistent normative framework to analyze when 
privacy analogies are appropriate across the public-private divide. In deciding whether 
such privacy analogies make sense, courts ought to apply a multifactored test in which 
they consider the presence or absence of factors regarding the privacy-invading actor that 
could justify the traditional public-private distinction. These factors include power of 
coercion, ability to harm identity formulation or protection of democracy, access to 
superior technology, and presence of bureaucratic features. 
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Introduction 
An airplane flies over an industrial plant that has not yet been 
completed. No barriers prevent aerial viewing of the plant. Employees at 
the plant find the airplane suspicious and investigate. They discover that 
the airplane carried a photographer who had been hired to photograph the 
plant on behalf of an unidentified competitor. After the photographer 
refuses to reveal who hired him, the company sues the photographer.1 
Applying state trade secret law, a federal appellate court finds that the 
aerial photography could constitute improper means and allows the 
company to proceed with its lawsuit for misappropriation of a trade 
secret.2 The court explains that although the company had taken no 
precautions to protect against aerial surveillance during construction of 
the plant, the law does not require taking “unreasonable precautions”3 
against actions “which could not have been reasonably anticipated or 
prevented.”4 Thus, in a sense, the court suggested that the company had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial photography of its plant. 
Another airplane flies over a different industrial plant. Again no 
barriers prevent aerial viewing of the plant. Employees at the plant have 
been instructed to investigate any low-level flights over the plant. Upon 
further investigation, the employees discover that the airplane belongs to 
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) which had requested 
and been refused permission to conduct a second on-site inspection of 
the plant at issue. Instead of obtaining an administrative search warrant, 
the EPA hired an aerial photographer to photograph the facility from 
above. The company sues the EPA.5 Applying Fourth Amendment law 
and its “reasonable expectation of privacy” test,6 the Supreme Court 
holds in favor of the EPA, concluding that “the taking of aerial 
photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is 
not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”7 Notably, the Court 
finds the prior judicial determination that similar aerial photography by a 
competitor could be actionable under trade secret law to be “irrelevant” 
 
 1. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1970); see infra 
Part I.A. 
 2. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1015. 
 3. Id. at 1017. 
 4. Id. at 1016. 
 5. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229–30 (1986); see infra Part I.A. 
 6. Although the Court never quite explicitly says that the company does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy from aerial photography, this is apparent throughout the analysis and appears 
to be part of the basis for the Court’s conclusion. See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 235 (“Dow further 
contends that any aerial photography of this ‘industrial curtilage’ intrudes upon its reasonable 
expectations of privacy. . . . [T]he Court has drawn a line as to what expectations are reasonable in the 
open areas beyond the curtilage of a dwelling . . . .”). 
 7. Id. at 239. 
I - Schwartz_18 (Dukanovic) (Do Not Delete) 12/15/2015 6:01 PM 
146                                          HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:143 
to its consideration of whether the EPA’s aerial photography violated 
the company’s reasonable expectation of privacy.8 
The aerial photography example illustrates the public-private divide 
in privacy law. Under the public-private divide, courts analyze privacy 
violations by the government under a Fourth Amendment analysis that 
typically includes a determination of whether the plaintiff has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.9 Courts have made abundantly clear, 
however, that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the private 
sector.10 Thus, depending on the particular facts of the case, courts 
analyze privacy violations by private actors under a variety of other 
possible legal frameworks including state constitutional privacy 
provisions,11 federal statutes,12 state statutes,13 state privacy torts14 and even 
state trade secret law.15 Many of these legal frameworks contain doctrinal 
concepts analyzing the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s expectations of 
privacy,16 many of which can be similar to, but not always identical to the 
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.17 
This creates an analytical conundrum for courts. On the one hand, 
there exists an entrenched public-private divide in privacy law, in which 
the Court has repeatedly found that the Fourth Amendment does not 
 
 8. Id. at 232. 
 9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 
323 (1997). 
 11. Unlike its federal counterpart, the California state constitution’s privacy protections apply to 
the private sector. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994). 
 12. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2013) (applying to private-sector 
recordkeeping); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2013); id. § 201; id. 
§ 2703 (applying to electronic submissions and known unofficially as the “Stored Communications 
Act”); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2012) (applying 
to health information privacy). 
 13. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 435 (West 1998) (prohibiting employers from recording an 
employee in a restroom); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-471 (2009) (requiring businesses collecting social 
security numbers to create a privacy protection policy). 
 14. For a detailed overview of the privacy tort and its development, see Daniel J. Solove & Paul 
M. Schwartz, Information Privacy Law 77–231 (3d ed. 2009). 
 15. See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 16. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B (1974) (“A person shall have a right against 
unreasonable . . . interference with his privacy.”). See Gauthier v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 557 
N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Mass. 1990) (dismissing a section 1B tort claim because the plaintiff lacked a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy”); Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073–74 (Cal. 2009) 
(“The right to privacy in the California Constitution set standards similar to the common law tort of 
intrusion. . . . [W]e consider (1) the nature of any intrusion upon reasonable expectations of privacy, 
and (2) the offensiveness or seriousness of the intrusion, including any justification and other relevant 
interests.”) (emphasis added). 
 17. For example, although it is not formally an element of the claim, in order to succeed on an 
intrusion upon seclusion privacy tort, courts typically ask some variation on whether the plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 373 (8th Cir. 2002). 
Similarly, as explained in the aerial photography example, trade secret cases can involve a 
determination of whether the plaintiff used reasonable precautions in protecting the trade secret.  
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apply to the private sector.18 On the other hand, the very fluid concept of 
a reasonable expectation of privacy is a heavily norm-driven inquiry 
requiring by its very nature an inquiry into the prevailing societal norms. 
Thus the question remains whether courts conducting a reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis in a Fourth Amendment case can or 
should look to private-sector cases by analogy to help determine whether 
an expectation of privacy is reasonable. The aerial photography example 
suggests that the Court insists on maintaining the strict divide between 
the public and private sectors with regard to privacy law by rejecting 
analogies to private sector privacy law cases when analyzing the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in factually similar public sector 
cases.19 
To complicate matters, in the workplace privacy context, the Court 
has taken a different approach to analogizing across the public-private 
divide in privacy law.20 Suppose an employer wants to administer a drug 
test to an employee. Or, the employer wants to search the employee’s 
desk, or place a tracking device on them, or place a video camera in the 
workplace. The way courts analyze these various workplace privacy 
invasions varies depending on whether the employer is in the private or 
public sector.21 Under the traditional public-private divide, public-sector 
employees whose workplace privacy claims are evaluated under a Fourth 
Amendment framework receive stronger protection than their private-
sector equivalents.22 Unlike its staunch adherence to a strict public-
private divide and refusal to analogize across that divide in the aerial 
photography trade secret example, the Supreme Court considers employee 
expectations of privacy in the private sector a relevant consideration in the 
Fourth Amendment analysis of public-sector workplace privacy cases.23 
These diametrically different approaches by courts all the way up to 
the Supreme Court in terms of analogizing across the public-private 
divide result in a lack of clarity as to whether analogizing across the 
public-private divide is appropriate. Courts appear to freely analogize 
between the private sector privacy frameworks and the Fourth 
 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 
323 (1997). 
 19. See infra Part I.A. For a discussion of the public-private distinction more generally, see Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 504 (1985). 
 20. See infra Part I.B. For a discussion of the public-private divide in the workplace context, see 
S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 
32 Ga. L. Rev. 825, 828 (1998) (“Central to the understanding of privacy rights in the American 
workplace is the public/private distinction.”). 
 21. See Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 277, 283–302 
(2012). 
 22. See id. at 27879 (noting the conventional wisdom that public employees under the Fourth 
Amendment had greater expectations of privacy than their private-sector counterparts). 
 23. See infra Part I.B. 
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Amendment framework when it suits them and staunchly defend against 
such analogies when that is preferable. So can courts conducting a 
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in a Fourth Amendment case 
look to private-sector cases by analogy to help determine whether an 
expectation of privacy is reasonable? Or conversely, in deciding whether a 
private-sector privacy violation would be “highly offensive to a reasonable 
person,” as is required in a number of privacy torts, can or should courts 
look to factually similar Fourth Amendment cases by analogy for some 
perspective as to what is considered reasonable? Similarly, should courts 
look to Fourth Amendment discussions of reasonableness in order to help 
determine by analogy whether plaintiffs took reasonable precautions in 
the context of a trade secret case? Very little has been said by either courts 
or scholars on how to systematically decide when these types of analogies 
are appropriate.24 
This Article seeks to fill that void by developing a coherent and 
consistent normative framework for considering when such privacy 
analogies are appropriate across the public-private divide. In order to do 
so, this Article examines the systematic structural features of government 
that may have traditionally necessitated a different degree of privacy 
protection from the government than from private citizens and 
companies. In doing so, it seeks to uncover the motivating principles 
behind the Fourth Amendment that justify treating a similar privacy-
invading fact pattern differently because the government is the actor 
invading privacy. In other words, the Article seeks to explain the 
intuition that public-sector privacy invasions are more threatening, and 
thus more in need of protection than their private-sector counterparts. 
The Article identifies four traditional features of government that 
could make invasions of privacy by the government more troubling than 
similar invasions of privacy by a private actor. First, the government has 
traditionally had more coercive power than the private sector.25 Second, 
government invasions of privacy may harm the ability of individuals to 
form their own identity without interference or to act as the voice of 
democracy against government waste, abuse, and fraud.26 Third, the 
government, at least historically, had access to privacy-invading 
technology that the private sector did not have.27 Finally, the lack of 
accountability associated with bureaucratic features of government may 
cause supplementary reasons for concern.28 
 
 24. See infra Part I.C. 
 25. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 26. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 27. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 28. See infra Part II.A.4. 
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These customary differences, however, are beginning to break down 
in a modern world.29 This begs the question: once Google has satellite 
technology, Amazon has drones, and numerous companies make use of 
big data, does the superior technology justification behind a strict public-
private divide in privacy law still make sense? Or in the context of 
workplace privacy, do we consider the public-private divide differently if 
the private-sector employer is in the field of big data, such that it may 
have as much power and information over the employee as the 
government? Is it obvious that the harm behind the National Security 
Agency (“NSA”) collecting large amounts of e-mail metadata is different 
in kind and scope to Google collecting the same data?30 Of course all of 
these questions are made even more complicated by the fact that a good 
deal of information is shared between the private and public sectors.31 
In light of these complications, this Article offers guidance to courts 
and scholars considering the use of a privacy analogy across the public-
private divide. When deciding whether to analogize between the Fourth 
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy analysis and its private-
sector doctrinal counterparts, courts should evaluate the presence of the 
four identified features that traditionally made invasions of privacy by 
 
 29. See infra Part II.B. 
 30. The state action requirement of the federal Constitution does not in itself answer these 
questions. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Of course it goes without saying that the Fourth 
Amendment only applies to government actors. That precedent is clearly settled and this Article does 
not try to change the substantive Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in any way. The established 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the state action doctrine, however, only set the standard on the 
public-sector side of the comparison. The private-sector side of the comparison, currently covered by a 
hodgepodge of federal and state privacy and other related laws, remains open to change. For example, 
nothing prevents Congress from passing a law that states that private employees have the same degree 
of protection from workplace privacy invasions as would their public-sector counterparts. Similarly, 
nothing prevents a court from deciding that the appropriate standard for determining whether a 
company has a trade secret requires looking to whether that company would have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context. That may or may not be a good idea, but it 
is open to discussion that goes beyond the claim that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the 
private sector. 
 31. Many scholars have written on the extent to which the government and private sectors share 
information. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1, 7 (2008) (“[T]he line between public and private modes of surveillance and security has blurred 
if not vanished. Public and private enterprises are thoroughly intertwined.”); Amitai Etzioni, The 
Privacy Merchants: What Is to Be Done?, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 929, 951 (2012) (“[O]ne must assume 
that what is private is also public in two senses of these words: that one’s privacy (including sensitive 
matters) is rapidly corroded by the private sector and that whatever it learns is also available to the 
government.”); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 Miss. L.J. 1309, 
1320–21 (2012) (“The FBI and other law enforcement agencies will shift from being active producers 
of surveillance to passive consumers, essentially outsourcing all of their surveillance activities to 
private third parties, ones who are not only ungoverned by the state action requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment, but also who have honed the ability to convince private citizens to agree to be 
watched.”); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1083, 1095 (2002) (“[G]overnment is increasingly contracting with private-sector entities 
to acquire databases of personal information.”). 
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the government more troubling than similar invasions of privacy by a 
private actor. The appropriateness of the analogy will require a 
multifactored analysis considering the extent to which the government 
and the private-sector actor in the relevant cases’ fact patterns contain 
the four identified features.32 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies the haphazard 
way in which courts currently draw or refuse to draw analogies between 
trade secret and Fourth Amendment cases. It then engages in a similar 
analysis in the workplace privacy context. Part II explores the traditional 
differences between the public and private sectors that may justify a 
public-private divide in privacy law. This Part also identifies the ways in 
which these traditional justifications no longer make sense in the modern 
world. Part III uses the traditional differences identified in Part II as 
benchmarks in a multifactored test to be used as a coherent and 
consistent normative framework for courts and scholars considering use 
of a privacy analogy across the public-private divide. It then illustrates 
how that framework would work in various contexts. 
I.  The Traditional Public-Private Divide in Privacy Law 
Traditionally, the American legal system has maintained a strict 
divide between the public and private sectors with regard to privacy law. 
A violation of privacy that occurs by a public-sector actor typically gets 
filtered though a Fourth Amendment analysis.33 While the Fourth 
Amendment does not actually use the word “privacy,”34 its prohibition 
against certain searches and seizures necessarily protects against many 
governmental invasions of privacy—traditionally those by the police.35 
Although scholars have contended that the Fourth Amendment should 
not be viewed primarily through a privacy paradigm,36 there is little doubt 
 
 32. Admittedly, the factors identified in this Article are not novel concepts. Many of them already 
play a role in various aspects of judicial decisionmaking, or have been identified by scholars as 
important in other contexts. Furthermore, the factors likely only scratch the surface. The hope is that 
they will trigger a conversation that will lead to privacy analogizing by courts and scholars occurring in 
a coherent, rather than an ad hoc manner. 
 33. Public-sector privacy violations may also, depending on the specific facts, get analyzed under 
the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and arguably other constitutional provisions as well; 
however, the Fourth Amendment is the most likely basis for a claim. 
 34. The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 35. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1131. 
 36. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1016, 1060–77 (1995) (contending that the Fourth Amendment law’s concern with privacy has led 
to abandoning a concern with coercion and violence); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth 
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751, 
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that privacy plays a pivotal role in the Fourth Amendment framework. 
This has been true at least since the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. 
United States added the “reasonable expectation of privacy” to the 
Fourth Amendment analysis.37 
The Fourth Amendment does not, however, apply to the private 
sector. Pursuant to the state action doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
“consistently construed” the Fourth Amendment “as proscribing only 
governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, 
even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as 
an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of 
any governmental official.’”38 Therefore, unlike privacy violations in the 
public sector, privacy violations that occur in the private sector are not 
analyzed under a Fourth Amendment framework. Consequently, the 
Supreme Court has referred to the private sector as “a domain unguarded 
by Fourth Amendment constraints.”39 Instead, courts analyze private-
sector privacy violations under a hodgepodge of other legal frameworks 
including state constitutional claims,40 topic-specific federal statutes,41 the 
FTC’s privacy regulation,42 state statutes,43 state privacy torts44 and other 
state common law claims such as trade secrets.45 
 
1777 (1994) (defining the “constitutional value underlying the Fourth Amendment as that of ‘trust’ 
between the government and the citizenry”). 
 37. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Solove, supra 
note 31, at 1118, 1121, 1128 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment’s focus has been on protecting 
privacy against certain government actions, and that some notion of privacy has been the trigger for 
Fourth Amendment protection at least since the late nineteenth century). 
 38. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Walter 
v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)).   
 39. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997). 
 40. California’s state constitution contains privacy protections that also apply to the private 
sector. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994). 
 41. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2013) (applying to private-sector 
recordkeeping); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2013); id. § 201; 
id. § 2703 (applying to electronic submissions and known unofficially as the “Stored Communications 
Act”); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2012) (applying 
to health information privacy). 
 42. See generally Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2014) (describing the FTC’s role in enforcing companies’ privacy 
policies by using its unfair and deceptive trade practices authority as the functional equivalent of a 
body of common law); see also F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(upholding the FTC’s power to regulate corporate cybersecurity failures that violate corporate privacy 
policies under its unfair and deceptive trade practices authority). 
 43. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 435 (West 1998) (prohibiting employers from recording an 
employee in a restroom); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-471 (2009) (requiring businesses collecting social 
security numbers to create a privacy protection policy). 
 44. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Calif. 
L. Rev. 1887, 1917 (2010) (noting that “nearly every state recognizes at least one form of the privacy 
torts”). 
 45. See infra Part I.A. 
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A. Trade Secret Law and the Fourth Amendment 
This traditional public-private divide in privacy law plays out in the 
context of certain trade secret law cases. Although trade secret doctrine 
involves numerous concepts that do not exist in the Fourth Amendment 
context, trade secret cases can involve violations of privacy in various 
factual scenarios. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that trade 
secret law is necessary to protect “a most fundamental right, that of 
privacy.”46 Scholars have discussed the link between trade secret law and 
privacy,47 and have described corporate privacy interests as part of the 
“fundamental nature of trade secret rights.”48 Even Justices Brandeis and 
Warren’s seminal field-creating Harvard Law Review article, The Right 
to Privacy, argued that notions of privacy are embodied in trade secret 
law.49 
At the doctrinal level, under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(“UTSA”), which has been adopted by forty-seven states,50 one of the 
ways in which trade secret misappropriation can occur is when someone 
acquires a trade secret by “improper means.”51 Although the definition of 
“improper means” does not explicitly list violations of privacy, some of 
the possibilities listed such as theft or espionage can involve privacy 
violations depending on the specific means by which the theft or 
espionage occurs.52 Similarly, under the Restatement of Torts, a trade 
secret violation can occur when someone discloses or uses a trade secret 
that was discovered by improper means.53 Under either standard, a trade 
secret plaintiff can prevail when a competitor or other individual invades 
the privacy of the company in the course of acquiring a trade secret by 
improper means. 
 
 46. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (“A most fundamental human 
right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is made profitable; the 
state interest in denying profit to such illegal ventures is unchallengeable.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1125, 1152 
(2000); Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret 
Law, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 667, 670. 
 48. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the 
Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1425, 1431, 1434–35 (2009). 
 49. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 21213 
(1890). 
 50. The UTSA has been adopted by every state except New York, North Carolina, and 
Massachusetts. Texas became the forty-seventh state to adopt the UTSA in May 2013. Massachusetts 
has introduced a bill to enact the UTSA, which remains pending as of this writing. Legislative Fact 
Sheet – Trade Secrets Act, Uniform L. Commission, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx? 
title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
 51. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(1) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Restatement of Torts § 757 (Am. Law Inst. 1939). The Restatement holds a trade secret 
violation occurs when “[o]ne who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to do so, 
is liable to the other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use 
constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him.” Id. 
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Furthermore, the trade secret and Fourth Amendment contexts can 
both involve extremely factually similar invasions of privacy from the 
perspective of the company whose privacy is being invaded.54 
Nonetheless, as the result of the traditional public-private divide in 
privacy law, a violation of privacy would be analyzed under entirely 
distinct frameworks depending on whether the privacy invasion occurred 
by the private sector, in which case a trade secret framework would 
apply, or by the government, in which case the Fourth Amendment 
framework would apply. 
While it is abundantly clear that Fourth Amendment law does not 
apply to private-sector trade secret cases, there are a number of 
similarities between the two legal doctrines. For example, in the private-
sector trade secret context, a claimed trade secret is not eligible for 
protection if the owner did not use reasonable efforts to ensure that the 
trade secret remained secret.55 Similarly, under the “reasonable expectation 
of privacy test” in Katz, a Fourth Amendment claim only attaches if the 
plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy over the claimed private 
domain. Thus, both doctrines involve consideration of the reasonableness of 
the asserted claim to privacy. 
The traditional public-private divide serves to filter private-sector 
cases into a trade secret framework and public-sector cases into a Fourth 
Amendment framework. At the same time, in many circumstances the 
two types of cases may involve both similar fact patterns as well as some 
doctrinal similarities between the two distinct legal frameworks. As such, 
courts, advocates, and scholars might wonder whether it is appropriate to 
analogize across the public-private divide in such cases. Specifically, in 
deciding whether a trade secret plaintiff used reasonable efforts to 
ensure that a trade secret remained secret, can and should courts 
analogize to a factually similar case in the public Fourth Amendment 
context in which a court determined whether similar efforts were 
sufficient to create a reasonable expectation of privacy? The idea is not 
that Fourth Amendment precedent would be dispositive in trade secret 
 
 54. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Fourth Amendment applies to the privacy 
interests of corporations. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8 (1984) (noting that the 
Fourth Amendment protection of privacy interests in business premises “is . . . based upon societal 
expectations that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment”); Marshall v. Barlow’s, 
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (observing, in the OSHA administrative search context, that “it is 
untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was not intended to shield places of business as well as 
of residence”); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 18 (U.S. June 30, 
2014) (noting that “extending Fourth Amendment protection to corporations protects the privacy 
interests of employees and others associated with the company”). 
 55. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 674 (Wash. 1987) (“[T]rade secrets law 
protects the author’s very ideas if they possess some novelty and are undisclosed or disclosed only on 
the basis of confidentiality.”) (emphasis added); Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720, 
725 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that “the extent of measures taken to guard the secrecy of the 
information” is relevant to determining whether that information is a trade secret). 
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cases, but merely that it would help flesh out, by analogy, what sorts of 
efforts courts and society are prepared to recognize as reasonable. 
Conversely, in deciding whether a plaintiff has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context, can and 
should courts analogize to a factually similar case in the trade secret 
context in which a court determined that trade secret protective actions 
were sufficiently reasonable to satisfy that aspect of the trade secret 
analysis? Here again, the trade secret precedent would not be dispositive 
of the entire Fourth Amendment claim, but merely helpful to analyze 
what sorts of privacy claims courts and society are prepared to recognize 
as reasonable. 
Currently, courts lack any clarity or guidance for when such 
analogizing is appropriate and have not developed a framework for 
evaluating when the analogy makes sense. The two factually similar cases 
involving aerial photography discussed briefly above and expounded 
upon below illustrate this problem. 
In E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, the Fifth Circuit 
analyzed a trade secret case involving aerial photography of an industrial 
plant owned by the plaintiff, DuPont.56 The case arose out of Texas 
where an unknown third party, presumably one of DuPont’s competitors, 
hired the Christophers to take aerial photographs of a DuPont plant that 
was still under construction.57 DuPont had built the plant to facilitate the 
production of methanol by means of a “highly secret but unpatented 
process.”58 DuPont employees noticed the aircraft flying over the plant 
and launched an investigation by which they discovered that the 
Christophers had taken sixteen aerial photographs while circling the 
plant in their aircraft.59 
DuPont filed suit alleging trade secret violation, and after the 
Christophers refused to disclose who had hired them during their 
depositions, the district court granted a motion to compel.60 The 
Christophers sought an interlocutory appeal on whether DuPont had 
stated a claim.61 The Christophers argued that they could not have 
misappropriated DuPont’s claimed trade secret when they were “in public 
airspace, violated no government aviation standard, did not breach any 
confidential relation, and did not engage in any fraudulent or illegal 
conduct.”62 Applying the Restatement of Torts’ definition of a trade secret, 
 
 56. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1013–14. 
 61. Id. at 1014. 
 62. Id. 
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which the Texas Supreme Court had adopted at the time,63 the Fifth 
Circuit found that illegal conduct was not necessary for misappropriation, 
and that the invasion of privacy that resulted from the aerial photography 
was sufficient.64 
The Christophers argued that DuPont had not stated a proper claim 
for trade secret misappropriation because DuPont did not take 
reasonable precautions in its failure to cover the facility during 
construction and thus allowed the facility to be viewed from the air.65 The 
court rejected that argument, however, holding that it would be unfair to 
permit espionage “when the protections required to prevent another’s 
spying cost so much that the spirit of inventiveness is dampened.”66 The 
court refused to go so far as to prevent viewing of “open fields,” but 
explained that a trade secret owner should not be forced to “guard 
against the unanticipated, the undetectable, or the unpreventable 
methods of espionage now available.”67 Because the finished plant would 
protect the process from view even from aerial espionage, requiring 
DuPont to construct a temporary barrier over the unfinished plant 
“would impose an enormous expense to prevent nothing more than a 
school boy’s trick.”68 According to the court, requiring DuPont to create 
an “impenetrable fortress” would be an unreasonable requirement.69 
Having thus concluded that the aerial photography was improper, the 
court found that DuPont could sustain a cause of action for trade secret 
violation against the Christophers for their actions.70 
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court heard a case with 
somewhat similar facts, except that this time it was the government that 
violated a corporation’s privacy by means of aerial photography.71 Unlike 
in Christopher, however, where the Fifth Circuit held that aerial 
photographs taken of a plant could sustain a cause of action for a trade 
secret violation, the Court in Dow Chem. Co. v. United States rejected 
the argument that aerial photographs taken of a plant by the government 
 
 63. Texas has since adopted the UTSA. See 6 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 134A.001 (2013). 
 64. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1014. The Restatement holds a trade secret violation occurs when 
someone “discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if 
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of 
confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him.” Restatement of Torts § 757 
(Am. Law Inst. 1939). 
 65. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1016. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1017. 
 70. Id. Practically speaking, of course, this “victory” may not have accomplished very much. The 
Christophers were likely judgment proof, the aerial photographs had already been transferred to the 
unknown third party, and DuPont still did not know the identity of the third-party competitor who had 
hired the Christophers. 
 71. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986). 
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violated the Fourth Amendment.72 Dow operated a 2000-acre facility in 
Michigan that “consisted of numerous covered buildings with . . . 
equipment and piping conduits . . . exposed” between the buildings.73 
Dow had “elaborate security” around the complex that prevented public 
observation from the ground level.74 Also, Dow instructed its employees 
to investigate any low-level flights over the facility.75 Dow did not, 
however, construct any barriers to prevent aerial viewing.76 
In 1978, the EPA conducted an on-site inspection of two power 
plants located on the premises with the consent of Dow.77 The EPA 
requested a second inspection, which Dow rejected.78 Rather than obtain 
an administrative search warrant, the EPA hired a commercial aerial 
photographer to take photographs of the facility with an aerial mapping 
camera.79 Dow was not informed of the EPA’s actions and upon learning 
of the aerial surveillance, filed for injunctive and declaratory relief 
alleging in part that the EPA violated the Fourth Amendment.80 
The Supreme Court held that the plant was not analogous to the 
curtilage of a dwelling and the photographs were not a search prohibited 
by the Fourth Amendment.81 Because Dow had “elaborately secured” its 
plant, the Court found that the space between the buildings fell 
somewhere between both doctrines.82 The government has “‘greater 
latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property’” 
because the reasonable expectation of privacy is significantly different than 
someone’s home.83 The difference here was that the aerial observation did 
not involve a “physical entry.”84 Because it was observable to the public, 
a government regulatory inspector should not need a warrant.85 
The Christopher case had enough factual similarity that it might 
have been considered by the Court in Dow Chemical Co. as persuasive 
authority in considering the reasonable expectation of privacy aspect of 
the Fourth Amendment question. Both cases involved invasion of a 
company’s privacy by means of aerial photography of a company facility. 
Both cases required the court to consider whether the industrial plant 
should be required to build a barrier preventing the facility from being 
 
 72. Id. at 239. 
 73. Id. at 229. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 230. 
 81. Id. at 239. 
 82. Id. at 236–37. 
 83. Id. at 237–38 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598–99 (1981)). 
 84. Id. at 237. 
 85. Id. at 238 (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978)). 
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viewed from the air, and whether failure to do so meant that the 
company had not taken sufficient steps to protect its privacy. In Dow 
Chemical Co., the Supreme Court apparently recognized these factual 
similarities between the case before them involving a Fourth 
Amendment claim for the EPA’s aerial photography, and the Fifth 
Circuit precedent in Christopher holding that aerial photography of an 
industrial plant could constitute a misappropriation of a trade secret 
violation.  
Instead of considering whether the Christopher case might at least 
be persuasive authority, however, the Court stated that the trade secret 
analogy was “irrelevant to the questions presented,” not because the case 
was factually distinguishable, but rather because state tort law “does not 
define the limits of the Fourth Amendment.”86 In support of its claim that 
state tort law “does not define the limits of the Fourth Amendment,” the 
Supreme Court cited Oliver v. United States87 for the proposition that 
“trespass law does not necessarily define limits of [the] Fourth 
Amendment.” The Court’s shift from a position that state tort law does 
not have to define the limits of the Fourth Amendment to a position that 
state tort law is “irrelevant to the questions presented” is significant. The 
former formulation merely suggests that state tort law is not binding 
when it comes to Fourth Amendment limits, or in other words that there 
is a public-private divide in privacy law. The latter formulation, with its 
claim to irrelevance, rejects not only the binding effect of state tort law, 
but also any persuasive impact of state tort law or efforts to analogize 
across the public-private divide.88 Viewing the public-private divide as 
absolute, the Court refused to answer whether the same tactics employed 
by a competitor would violate trade secret law.89 
 
 86. Id. at 232 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)). The Court used the following 
explanatory parenthetical in its citation of Oliver: “(trespass law does not necessarily define limits of 
Fourth Amendment).” Id. While the Court argues that state law has no bearing on Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, it simultaneously points out that it “does not necessarily define [the] 
limits,” which implies that tort or property law may set a boundary on Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Id. 
 87. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 88. Sam Kamin describes Dow Chemical Co. as stating that “the fact that government conduct 
would have been tortious or criminal if done by a private actor is but one factor to be considered in 
determining whether that conduct violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Sam Kamin, The 
Private is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 
83, 113–14 (2004). I disagree with that reading of the case. Nothing in Dow Chemical Co. suggests that 
the Court would be willing to consider the private-sector conduct as even “one factor to be 
considered.” Instead, the Court’s language consistently describes the private-sector precedent as 
“irrelevant.” Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 232; see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 459 n.3 (1989) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the decision in Dow Chemical Co. as the Court having “declined 
to consider trade-secret laws indicative of a reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
 89. Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 231. 
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The partial dissent in Dow Chemical Co. by Justices Powell, 
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun disagreed with the majority’s 
dismissal of the relevance of the trade secret analogy.90 The dissent noted 
that previous decisions held that a reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists in the Fourth Amendment context “if it is rooted in a ‘source 
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of 
real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized 
and permitted by society.’”91 Under their view, laws protecting trade 
secrets can be persuasive analogies to demonstrate society’s beliefs 
regarding a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
To be clear, there were a number of factual differences by which the 
Supreme Court decision in Dow Chemical Co. could have legitimately 
distinguished the Christopher precedent. The Court could have explained 
that the fact that DuPont was found to have taken reasonable 
precautions when it failed to cover its facility during the construction 
phase does not necessarily suggest that Dow had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy from aerial photography in its plant, which 
remained uncovered after the construction of the plant had been 
completed. Alternatively, the Court could have concluded that the 
fourteen-year gap between the two cases changed the plaintiff’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy because aerial photography became 
increasingly common in the interim. Either of these approaches would 
have permitted the Court to consider the analogy to the trade secret case 
in order to determine its usefulness in evaluating the plaintiff’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial photography. Ultimately, 
in doing so the Court could then have rejected the analogy as factually 
distinguishable. Instead, however, the Supreme Court confusingly 
rejected the trade secret precedent as irrelevant solely by virtue of its 
state tort law status, rather than because it was factually distinguishable. 
Although the Supreme Court in Dow Chemical Co. found a 
factually similar trade secret case “irrelevant” to its Fourth Amendment 
analysis by virtue of its state tort law status, this did not put to rest the 
question of the appropriateness of analogies between Fourth 
Amendment and trade secret cases. Other courts analyzing trade secret 
cases have been willing to analogize in the opposite direction to relevant 
cases in the Fourth Amendment context. This only exacerbates the 
uncertainty regarding the correct treatment of privacy analogies across 
the private-public divide, and leaves open the question of whether it is 
possible that the analogies are acceptable when analogizing in one 
direction, but “irrelevant” when analogizing in the opposite direction. 
 
 90. Id. at 248 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 91. Id. 
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For example, in Tennant Co. v. Advance Machine Co., a Minnesota 
Court of Appeals found it appropriate to analogize to the Fourth 
Amendment context in deciding a trade secret case involving the privacy 
of trash.92 Tennant involved business competitors, Tennant and Advance, 
who both manufactured and marketed floor cleaning equipment.93 For 
two years, Advance employees went through Tennant’s trash, which had 
been disposed of in sealed trash bags, and put in a covered dumpster 
behind Tennant’s sales offices in California, which was only used by 
Tennant.94 The dumpster diving scheme was conceived by an Advance 
sales representative, McIntosh.95 He used the information he gained to 
send memos summarizing the content of the stolen documents to 
Advance’s Vice President of Sales.96 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals considered a misappropriation of 
trade secrets claim under the California Unfair Practices Act.97 The court 
pointed out that among the relevant factors in determining whether 
information is a trade secret is “the extent of measures taken to guard 
the secrecy of the information.”98 The court explained that Tennant had 
“disposed of its waste in a manner that would assure secrecy except to 
someone particularly intent on finding out inside information” and 
concluded that “[t]he measures taken to guard the secrecy of the sales 
lists were adequate.”99 
In reaching that conclusion, the court appeared to be influenced by 
its earlier discussion of how the case would have been resolved under 
Fourth Amendment law.100 The court noted that the law in California was 
settled that “an owner retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of a dumpster ‘until the trash [has] lost its identity and meaning 
by becoming part of a large conglomeration of trash elsewhere.’”101 The 
court found “no reason” to apply a different standard in a civil case 
because an owner “has the same expectation of privacy in property 
regardless of whether the invasion is carried out by a law officer or by a 
competitor.”102 Subsequent to the Tennant decision, the Supreme Court 
held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash put out 
for collection under Fourth Amendment law.103 The key point raised by 
 
 92. See, e.g., Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 93. Id. at 722. 
 94. Id. at 722, 725. 
 95. Id. at 722. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 725. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (quoting People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268 (Cal. 1971)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988). 
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Tennant is not whether dumpster diving is acceptable, but rather whether 
in evaluating a dumpster-diving case in the trade secret context courts 
should be analogizing to discussions of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a dumpster in the applicable Fourth Amendment cases. The 
Tennant court strongly suggested that such analogizing was appropriate. 
A second court reviewing a dumpster-diving trade secret case 
agreed that Fourth Amendment analogies are appropriate, but the actual 
impact of the analogy changed in light of evolving Fourth Amendment 
law regarding dumpster diving. In Frank W. Winne & Son, Inc. v. 
Palmer,104 Palmer, the president of Twi-Ro-Pa,105 instructed an employee 
to collect Winne’s trash and to forward any office documents found 
therein to him.106 The documents forwarded included invoices, customer 
lists, documents containing the names of factories the plaintiff used, and 
purchase orders that reflected the cost and pricing of Winne’s orders.107 
Upon learning of the theft, Winne filed suit alleging trade secret 
violations and tortious interference with contractual relationships with 
customers.108 After an “improper means” analysis, the court considered 
whether Winne had taken adequate protections to protect the trade 
secret because failure to do so would preclude recovery.109 
In undertaking its analysis, the Pennsylvania court turned to Fourth 
Amendment cases for persuasive authority to determine if there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to protect the trade secret 
documents left in the trash.110 Among others, the court discussed the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Greenwood holding that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in trash that has been placed for 
collection.111 The Palmer court explained that it found the reasoning in 
those Fourth Amendment cases to be “persuasive.”112 Thus, the court 
demonstrated its belief that the analysis of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy in Fourth Amendment cases can be used as an analogy to 
determine similar questions in the trade secret private-sector context. 
Although the Palmer court recognized that the Fourth Amendment cases 
were “not commercial trade secret cases,” it nonetheless found that “it is 
rather difficult to find that one has taken reasonable precautions to 
safeguard a trade secret when one leaves it in a place where, as a matter 
 
 104. No. 91-2239, 1991 WL 155819 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1991). 
 105. Both Winne and Twi-Ro-Pa were competitors in the business of manufacturing and selling 
rope. Id. at *1. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at *3. 
 110. Id. at *4. 
 111. Id. at *4 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988)). 
 112. Id. 
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of law, he has no reasonable expectation of privacy from prying eyes.”113 
This language suggests that the court felt that Fourth Amendment law 
could set the floor for whether there were adequate precautions taken. 
Other courts, however, have not approved of analogizing to Fourth 
Amendment cases in analyzing trade secret cases. Unlike the Pennsylvania 
court in Palmer, which approved of and used Fourth Amendment 
analogies, a California Court of Appeal criticized the use of such 
analogies in Tennant. The California appellate court explained that 
“Fourth Amendment principles which may be useful in resolving a 
criminal search and seizure dispute are of little relevance to a civil claim.”114 
The court expanded that: “The question whether the state’s agents violate a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy by seizing items placed in the 
trash for purposes of the constitutional prohibition on unreasonable 
searches raises materially different issues” than similar actions taking place 
in the private sphere.115 
To summarize, certain courts have found it permissible for trade 
secret cases to analogize to the Fourth Amendment reasonable 
expectation of privacy jurisprudence for assistance in determining 
whether the plaintiff used reasonable precautions to protect a trade 
secret. Other courts, however, have rejected precisely the same sort of 
analogy. Additionally, in the reverse context, the Supreme Court found a 
factually similar trade secret case to be “irrelevant” in determining 
whether a plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of 
conducting its Fourth Amendment analysis.116 These inconsistent 
treatments of analogies across the public-private divide grow even more 
incoherent when the scope of the analysis shifts from the trade secret 
context to other areas of privacy law. 
B. Workplace Privacy and the Fourth Amendment 
The traditional public-private divide in privacy law also plays a role 
in the context of workplace privacy. Employers can and do invade the 
privacy of their employees in various ways including, but not limited to, 
drug testing, medical testing, psychological and personality testing, 
polygraph testing, workplace surveillance, monitoring e-mail, and GPS 
tracking. If the employee works for a governmental employer then courts 
may analyze the privacy invasion under a Fourth Amendment 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Ananda Church of Self-Realization v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370, 377 
n.3 (2002). Although the civil claim being analyzed in the case was for conversion of personal 
property, there is no reason to believe that the court’s critique or analysis would be any different for a 
civil claim under trade secret law as the same logic applies. 
 115. Id. (discussing reasonable expectations of privacy in the context of a civil conversion claim). 
 116. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 232 (1986). 
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framework.117 If, however, the employee works in the private sector, a 
Fourth Amendment claim is not available.118 This difference occurs 
because under the state action doctrine, only public-sector employees 
can bring constitutional claims.119 As a result, the “[c]onventional wisdom 
has long held that public employees with federal constitutional 
protections have stronger workplace rights than their private-sector 
counterparts.”120 As explained below, the conventional wisdom may no 
longer hold true. 
Without the ability to pursue Fourth Amendment claims, private-
sector employees are limited to pursuing claims under either state common 
law privacy torts, or various scattered federal and state statutes.121 Of the 
four privacy torts captured in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the 
intrusion upon seclusion tort is the most applicable in private-sector 
workplace privacy cases.122 Under the Restatement’s formulation, the 
intrusion upon seclusion tort involves “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his 
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion 
of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”123 Although the Restatement language does not expressly include 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” language, in applying this tort, courts 
often consider whether the employee had a “reasonable expectation of 
 
 117. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989). 
 118. Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“It is also true that private 
employers, unconstrained by the Fourth Amendment, may engage in practices the government as 
employer cannot.”); Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Kanawha Cty. Bd. of Educ., 592 F. Supp. 2d 883, 892 
(S.D.W.Va. 2009) (“Private employers are free to search their employees because the Fourth 
Amendment ‘does not apply to searches by private parties, absent governmental involvement.’”) 
(quoting United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1203 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
 119. See Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 592 F. Supp. at 892. 
 120. Secunda, supra note 21, at 278. 
 121. Id. at 279. 
 122. Factual patterns that would trigger the other privacy torts—false light, public disclosure of 
private facts, and misappropriation of name or likeness—occur less frequently in the workplace 
privacy context than do facts involving employer intrusion upon seclusion. See Wilborn, supra note 20, 
at 842 n.66, 844 (noting that the “tort that most plaintiffs use to challenge employer monitoring and 
surveillance is the intrusion on seclusion tort”). 
 123. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (Am. Law Inst. 1977). For purposes of this 
discussion, this Article expressly discusses the Restatement (Second) of Torts rather than the 
Restatement (Third) of Employment Law. This is because whereas, forty-one states and the District of 
Columbia have applied some version of the intrusion upon seclusion tort, with many expressly 
adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts formulation, to date no court has expressly applied the 
similar tort from the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law. The Restatement of Employment Law 
creates a “new” tort by applying the existing intrusion upon seclusion tort into the employment 
context to create the tort of “wrongful employer intrusion upon a protected employee privacy 
interest.” The “new” tort consists of an application of the traditional intrusion upon seclusion tort in 
the employment context and does not substantively change the doctrinal analysis of the traditional 
tort. Therefore, the discussion here ought to apply equally to the new context once courts begin to 
adopt the new tort. For an extremely useful analysis of the wrongful employer intrusion tort, see 
Secunda, supra note 21, at 294–301. 
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privacy” in order to determine whether the employee had a privacy 
interest that could be intruded upon.124 
In the public-sector employment context, the Supreme Court has 
clearly established that the “Fourth Amendment applies as well when the 
Government acts in its capacity as an employer.”125 The precise test for 
Fourth Amendment claims against government employers, however, 
remains somewhat unclear as a result of various Supreme Court cases 
evoking multiple possible tests. 
The Court first considered employee rights to privacy in the public 
workplace in O’Connor v. Ortega126 in 1987. The case involved the 
workplace privacy rights of physician and psychiatrist Dr. Magno 
Ortega.127 Dr. Ortega worked as the Chief of Professional Education, 
training the young physicians in the psychiatric residency programs at 
Napa State Hospital, a government-run facility.128 In 1981, hospital 
officials grew concerned regarding possible improprieties in Dr. Ortega’s 
management of the residency program, including two charges of sexual 
harassment of female hospital employees, discrepancies regarding Dr. 
Ortega’s acquisition of a computer for the program, and allegations that 
he had taken inappropriate disciplinary action against a resident.129 
During an investigation of these charges, hospital personnel searched Dr. 
Ortega’s office, and seized several personal items including a Valentine’s 
Day card, a photograph, and a book of poetry, as well as billing 
documentation of one of Dr. Ortega’s private patients.130 Dr. Ortega sued 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the search of his office 
violated the Fourth Amendment.131 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, a four-Justice plurality 
authored by Justice O’Connor applied a two-step analysis for public-
sector workplace privacy Fourth Amendment claims.132 First, a court 
must evaluate “[t]he operational realities of the workplace” in order to 
determine whether an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are 
 
 124. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 100–01 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (applying the 
Restatement definition of intrusion upon seclusion and concluding that there was no “reasonable 
expectation of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor” 
and thus “any reasonable expectation of privacy was lost”); see also Restatement (Third) of Emp’t 
Law § 7.01 cmt. g (Am. Law Inst. 2014) (observing that the concept of a ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ is common to workplace privacy analyses in both the public and private sectors). 
 125. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756 (2010) (citing Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)). 
 126. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
 127. Id. at 712–14. 
 128. Id. at 712. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 713. 
 131. Id. at 714. 
 132. Id. at 717, 725–26. 
I - Schwartz_18 (Dukanovic) (Do Not Delete) 12/15/2015 6:01 PM 
164                                          HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:143 
implicated.133 The plurality explained that at the first step, “the question 
whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis.”134 Second, where the employee has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, an employer’s intrusion on that 
expectation “should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under 
all the circumstances.”135 This standard involves balancing “the invasion 
of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the 
government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of 
the workplace.”136 The plurality decision evaluated the reasonableness of 
the employer’s search by considering both whether the search was 
reasonable in its inception, as well as whether it was reasonable in its 
scope.137 
Providing the fifth necessary vote, Justice Scalia would have skipped 
the plurality’s first-step inquiry into “operational realities” and instead 
would assume that searches of the offices of government employees as 
well as the personal items in that office always receive a Fourth 
Amendment inquiry.138 Having determined that Fourth Amendment 
protections are triggered, Justice Scalia would have nonetheless held 
“that government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to 
investigate violations of workplace rules” do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.139 
Although the Court failed to reach a consensus regarding what test 
governs the scope of a public employee’s Fourth Amendment workplace 
privacy claims, in each of their opinions the various Justices did appear 
to agree that analogies to the private sector are appropriate in 
adjudicating these claims. In contrast to the Supreme Court’s apparent 
rejection of analogies across the public-private divide in the trade secret 
context, in the workplace privacy context each of the key Court opinions 
in O’Connor suggested that such analogies to the private sector are 
useful and appropriate. On this point at least the Court appears united. 
First, the Justice O’Connor plurality opinion in O’Connor suggested 
that it is appropriate for courts to analogize to the private sector in 
deciding whether a public-sector employee has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in a particular case. In applying the “operational realities” test, 
the plurality decision explained that “[p]ublic employees’ expectations of 
privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations 
 
 133. Id. at 717. 
 134. Id. at 718. 
 135. Id. at 725–26. 
 136. Id. at 719–20. 
 137. Id. at 726. 
 138. Id. at 730–31 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 139. Id. at 732. 
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of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual 
office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.”140 
Second, Justice Scalia’s concurrence in O’Connor also suggests that 
analogies to the private sector are appropriate in deciding whether a 
public-sector employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy, except 
Scalia conducts the analysis on a sweeping basis, rather than the case-by-
case approach used by the plurality. Justice Scalia “would hold that 
government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate 
violations of workplace rules—searches of the sort that are regarded as 
reasonable and normal in the private-employer context—do not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.”141 Thus Scalia’s test would require a court to 
decide whether a particular government search is a search of the sort that 
is regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context. 
One way for a court to figure out if a search is considered reasonable and 
normal in the private-employer context is to analogize to the reasoning 
of private-sector privacy cases considering a similar type of employer 
search. Thus both the plurality and concurring opinions in O’Connor 
suggest that analogies to private-sector cases are appropriate.142 
For over two decades after O’Connor, the Supreme Court did not 
clarify which of the two analyses—the Justice O’Connor plurality 
formulation, or Justice Scalia’s concurring formulation—governed the 
scope of a public employee’s Fourth Amendment rights. During that 
time, most judicial decisions and litigants assumed that the plurality 
decision governed, and most did not address Scalia’s concurring test.143 
In 2010, in City of Ontario v. Quon,144 the Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to elucidate the governing test for public-sector workplace 
privacy claims. Instead, the Supreme Court’s decision added further 
uncertainty to the scope of a public employee’s Fourth Amendment 
rights in the workplace. The case involved the privacy rights of Jeff 
Quon, a police sergeant and Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) 
Team member with the Ontario Police Department.145 The City of 
Ontario issued pagers to Quon and his colleagues to help them respond 
to emergency situations.146 A written “Computer Usage, Internet and E-
 
 140. Id. at 717 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
 141. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 142. In fact, even the dissent in O’Connor suggested a link between the public and private sectors. 
Id. at 739 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contending that “the reality of work in modern time, whether 
done by public or private employees, reveals why a public employee’s expectation of privacy in the 
workplace should be carefully safeguarded and not lightly set aside”) (emphasis added). 
 143. See Pauline T. Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional Values in the Government Workplace, 
N.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 23 n.115) (on file with author) (listing cases ignoring Justice 
Scalia, as well as those considering his opinion, but determining that the plurality controlled). 
 144. 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
 145. Id. at 750. 
 146. Id. at 751. 
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mail Policy” (“Policy”) gave the city “the right to monitor and log all 
network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without 
notice,” and explained that “[u]sers should have no expectation of 
privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.”147 The Policy did 
not explicitly apply to text messaging, but the City explained that it 
would treat text messages the same as e-mails.148 
After Quon exceeded his monthly text message character allotment, 
he was warned that the pagers “could be audited,” but was told that 
there was no “intent to audit [an] employee’s text messages to see if the 
overage [was] due to work related transmissions.”149 Instead, Quon took 
advantage of an available opportunity to reimburse the city for the 
overage fee in lieu of an audit of his messages.150 Frustrated with this 
arrangement, the City decided to determine whether the existing 
character limit was too low, or whether the overages were for personal 
messages.151 The City requested, received, and reviewed transcripts of 
text messages sent by Quon, “and discovered that many of the messages 
. . . on Quon’s pager were not work related, and [that] some were 
sexually explicit.”152 Quon was disciplined and he filed suit against the 
City for various claims, including a violation of his Fourth Amendment 
right to privacy.153 
In Quon, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion reviewed the 
lingering O’Connor ambiguity on the proper analytical framework for 
Fourth Amendment claims against government employers.154 
Unhelpfully, however, the Court concluded it was “not necessary to 
resolve” which of the two approaches was correct155 because both 
approaches “lead to the same result here.”156 The Court also declined to 
resolve whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text 
messages sent on the pager.157 Instead, the Court assumed arguendo that 
Quon did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and proceeded to the 
second step of the analysis.158 For the second step, the Court held that the 
City’s review of the transcripts of Quon’s text messages was reasonable 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 752. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 752–53. 
 153. Id. at 753–54. 
 154. Id. at 756. 
 155. Id. at 757. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 760. 
 158. Id.  
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under either the Justice O’Connor159 or the Justice Scalia approach,160 and 
therefore the City “did not violate Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights” 
under either test.161 
Although the Quon decision left much to be desired, the Court once 
again suggested that analogizing to the private sector is appropriate in 
analyzing the reasonable expectation of privacy portion of a public-
sector Fourth Amendment workplace privacy case. Because the Court 
chose to assume without deciding that Quon had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, it did not have to actually engage in any private-
sector analogies to help determine whether Quon in fact had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his workplace pager. Nonetheless, 
language in the decision suggests that the Court would find such 
analogies useful and appropriate. 
For example, in its dicta the Court noted that at least one amicus 
pointed out that some states have recently passed statutes requiring 
employers to notify employees when monitoring their electronic 
communications.162 Unlike in the trade secret context, the Court did not 
reject this sort of reasoning as categorically irrelevant. Instead, the Court 
explained that “[a]t present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and 
the law’s treatment of them, will evolve.”163 This language suggests that 
the law’s treatment of private-sector workplace norms remains unclear, 
but should those norms solidify, then the private-sector cases would be 
appropriate for analogy. Furthermore, the Court’s phrasing that it is hard 
to predict the “degree to which society will be prepared to recognize 
those expectations as reasonable”164 also suggests that those analogies 
can be appropriate because private-sector cases are one way to gauge 
whether society is recognizing certain expectations as reasonable. 
Additionally, in the portion of the decision applying the alternative 
Scalia test, the Court clarified that the search of the pager transcripts 
“would be regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer 
context” and thus would satisfy the Scalia approach.165 This supports a 
reading of the O’Connor case whereby under the Scalia test courts could 
appropriately analogize to private-sector cases in order to either support 
 
 159. Id. at 764 (“Because the search was motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose, and 
because it was not excessive in scope, the search was reasonable under the approach of the O’Connor 
plurality.”). 
 160. Id. at 764–65 (“For these same reasons—that the employer had a legitimate reason for the 
search, and that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of that justification—the Court also 
concludes that the search would be ‘regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer 
context’ and would satisfy the approach of Justice Scalia’s concurrence.”). 
 161. Id. at 765. 
 162. Id. at 759. 
 163. Id. at 759–60. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 764–65. 
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a conclusion that a particular action is not considered reasonable and 
normal, or alternatively that society is prepared to recognize certain 
expectations as reasonable. 
Despite the apparent consensus within the Supreme Court that 
analogies to private-sector expectations of privacy are appropriate to 
determine reasonable expectations of privacy in the public workplace 
privacy context, the Court never expressly explains why such analogies 
make sense in this context,166 whereas similar analogies in the trade secret 
context were rejected as irrelevant. 
C. Lacking a Common Normative Framework for Privacy Analogies 
Just as courts have failed to offer a consistent and coherent 
normative framework for using privacy analogies across the public-
private divide in various contexts, the scholarly literature has not yet 
filled the gap. Although scholars and commentators have discussed the 
public-private divide in privacy law in various contexts, no one has yet 
offered a coherent normative framework for how to determine when 
such privacy analogies are appropriate across various substantive areas. 
Sam Kamin has written persuasively about the dangers of ignoring 
privacy violations by the private sector in favor of a myopic focus on 
state actors.167 He offers a descriptive claim that private-sector privacy 
invasions are crucial because courts will examine that conduct to 
determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the Fourth Amendment context.168 As a consequence, “the only way 
for individuals to gain protection against governmental intrusions into 
their privacy is to actively seek to protect their private information from 
all prying eyes, public and private.”169 Kamin claims that courts have 
wrongly focused on the actual conduct of the private sector rather than 
the legality of that conduct.170 As he explains, “the Court’s focus is 
generally on what members of the public could do as a practical matter, 
not what they are permitted to do as a legal matter.”171 As a result of this 
observation he contends that “laws designed to protect individual privacy 
from private actors are unlikely to increase the scope of privacy from the 
government.”172 Kamin’s contribution focuses on private-sector conduct 
rather than the circumstances in which courts should analogize to cases 
involving private-sector conduct. 
 
 166. See Kim, supra note 143, at 25 (“[T]he Court has not clearly spelled out why the analogy is 
relevant.”). 
 167. Kamin, supra note 88, at 84. 
 168. Id. at 85. 
 169. Id. at 87. 
 170. Id. at 86. 
 171. Id. at 112. 
 172. Id. at 107. 
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Kamin does suggest, however, that the Court’s use of privacy 
analogies to the private sector should be considered appropriate in 
determining the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in public-
sector cases.173 For example, he notes that state government assertions of 
the privacy expectations of their citizens “ought to be relevant to a 
federal court’s determination of whether a particular individual enjoyed 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.”174 Similarly, he contends that 
“nothing would prohibit a federal court from considering the fact that a 
state has protected the defendant against exactly the sort of privacy 
invasion engaged in by government agents in a given case.”175 Because 
these claims are not the main focus of his contribution, however, Kamin 
does not explain whether such analogies would be appropriate in every 
case, nor offer any framework for determining when such analogies 
should be used. 
Margot Kaminski and Kevin Bankston advocate analogizing to the 
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy standard in the 
subset of private-sector cases that involve statutory references to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.176 They argue that where a state 
statute expressly uses the exact phrase “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” courts should strongly presume that the legislature meant to 
incorporate the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding that term 
unless there is clear evidence otherwise.177 Where, however, the statute 
more obliquely references the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, 
they contend only that courts “may” reference the Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence by analogy.178 In that second statutory category, the 
framework provided by this Article could provide guidance to the Court 
in deciding whether to use the Fourth Amendment analogy or not. 
Other scholars have written about analogizing across the public-
private divide in the specific context of workplace privacy. In her earlier 
work, Pauline T. Kim has argued that “constitutional cases can and 
should provide experience in identifying those matters socially 
recognized to be private when determining the legitimacy of employee 
claims to privacy under the common law.”179 Kim explains that the 
constitutional cases can “provide further evidence of established privacy 
norms by identifying the core areas in which individual expectations of 
 
 173. See id. at 142–43. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 143. 
 176. Margot Kaminski & Kevin Bankston, A Unified Reasonable Expectation of Privacy? What 
United States v. Jones Means for Privacy Law Beyond the Fourth Amendment (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 177. Id. (manuscript at 14–17). 
 178. Id. (manuscript at 17–18). 
 179. Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 Ohio St. 
L.J. 671, 706 (1996). 
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privacy are recognized as reasonable.”180 More recently, however, Kim’s 
work rejects analogies in the opposite direction, arguing that “[r]elying 
on an analogy to private employment to interpret public employees’ 
constitutional rights is a mistake.”181 According to Kim, the analogy is 
inapt “[b]ecause the government employer stands in a different 
relationship to the public and to the market.”182 
Similarly, Paul Secunda bemoans what he sees as “the equalization 
of privacy rights in the public and private sector” that has resulted from 
the Court’s willingness to look to the private sector in determining 
public-sector workplace privacy cases.183 Secunda contends that 
“[n]ormatively, public employees should [receive] stronger workplace 
privacy [protection] than their private-sector equivalents.”184 Consequently, 
Secunda advocates a new two-step approach for workplace searches in the 
public sector.185 Because his analysis focused solely on workplace privacy 
issues, however, Secunda’s arguments do not offer any guidance for 
analogizing beyond the workplace privacy context. 
Other scholars have criticized the public-private distinction in the 
workplace privacy context, and have gone so far as to advocate 
eliminating the distinction altogether because it “simply does not make 
sense.”186 For example, Professor Betsy Malloy contends that given an 
aggregation of wealth and power, private employer invasions of privacy 
can be just as invasive and harmful as government invasions of privacy.187 
As a result, she “advocates the elimination of what has become an 
anachronistic inequality in the treatment of workplace privacy.”188 
Wilborn would achieve that result by the enactment of a comprehensive 
federal statute protecting the right to privacy of all employees.189 Other 
scholars have advocated abandoning the public versus private dichotomy 
completely by means of a new test that would find the majority of private 
employment behavior would constitute state action.190 Such solutions are 
 
 180. Id. at 705–06. 
 181. Kim, supra note 143 at 6 (writing about both privacy and First Amendment rights). 
 182. Id. at 27. 
 183. Secunda, supra note 21, at 281. 
 184. Id. Many of his arguments in favor of this normative position that public employees should 
have stronger workplace privacy rights than private-sector employees are extremely persuasive. In 
fact, some of them get incorporated into the normative framework for when privacy analogies are 
appropriate. See infra notes 216, 238. 
 185. Secunda, supra note 21, at 282. 
 186. See Wilborn, supra note 20, at 831. 
 187. Id. at 830. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 832. 
 190. See, e.g., Ronald P. Angerer II, Moving Beyond a Brick and Mortar Understanding of State 
Action: The Case for a More Majestic State Action Doctrine to Protect Employee Privacy in the 
Workplace, 4 Charlotte L. Rev. 1, 13–42 (2013) (advocating revisiting various aspects of the state 
action doctrine in order to limit the ability of the employer to invade employee privacy); David H.J. 
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unlikely to succeed as no such comprehensive federal statute has found 
its way through Congress, and there appears no realistic elimination of 
the state action doctrine on the horizon. Furthermore, such solutions 
would not help to answer the question of whether courts in other privacy 
contexts should analogize across the public-private divide. 
Others have addressed the topic of analogizing across the public-
private divide in the context of the Fourth Amendment and trade 
secrets.191 For example, one commentator, recognizing that some courts 
have used a Fourth Amendment analogy in trade secret cases, points out 
that “the analogy is appealing in some respects.”192 In other ways, 
however, he finds the analogy unattractive “particularly in light of the 
trade secret treatment of accidental disclosure, disclosure to third parties, 
misrepresentation of identity, and the relevance of the costs of privacy.”193 
Although this critique uses the language of “analogy,” it seems to conflate a 
Fourth Amendment analogy, which can merely be useful for analyzing 
certain elements of a trade secret claim, with entirely substituting the 
Fourth Amendment test for the trade secret framework.194 
Another commentator argues even more strongly that although 
some courts have suggested that certain standards within trade secret 
cases “can be derived by analogy to Fourth Amendment privacy 
jurisprudence,” the Fourth Amendment analogy fails as a result of the 
differences between the underlying sources of trade secret law and 
Fourth Amendment law.195 Among the various critiques of the analogy is 
that it “would leave courts without guidance in determining when” the 
analogy would apply.196 The best way to solve that problem, suggests the 
argument, is to simply say that the analogy should never apply. This 
Article offers a different solution by presenting guidance to courts to 
evaluate when such analogies make sense. 
 
Hermann III, Privacy, the Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict 
Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 73, 140–49 (1971) (explaining using the private 
state action approach to obtain constitutional protection for private employees). 
 191. Other scholars have explored the descriptive potential of other aspects of intellectual 
property law as a metaphor for describing Fourth Amendment law. See Nita A. Farahany, Searching 
Secrets, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1239, 1244 (focusing on copyright law as a descriptive metaphor to think 
about Fourth Amendment cases). 
 192. Bruce T. Atkins, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the 
Internet?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1151, 1182. 
 193. Id. at 1182–83. 
 194. This becomes further apparent later in the analysis. See id. at 1183 (“A Fourth Amendment-
like privacy interest is therefore too sweeping; it would create unnecessary causes of action that 
presently do not exist and would undermine trade secret law by reducing the need for security 
measures.”). 
 195. Judge Richard Posner, Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to the 
Fourth Amendment Analogy, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 461, 462 (1992). 
 196. Id. at 472. 
I - Schwartz_18 (Dukanovic) (Do Not Delete) 12/15/2015 6:01 PM 
172                                          HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:143 
Other commentators have supported courts drawing an analogy to 
the Fourth Amendment “reasonable expectation of privacy” in 
determining whether a trade secret owner has used reasonable 
precautions in protecting her trade secret.197 Under this view, if the owner 
of a trade secret has a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, that owner has used reasonable precautions in 
protecting the trade secret, and thus any violation of that reasonable 
expectation of privacy would constitute trade secret misappropriation.198 
In addition to the literature addressing analogizing across the 
public-private divide within specific Fourth Amendment contexts, other 
scholars have addressed analogizing across the public-private divide 
outside the Fourth Amendment context. For example, Lior Strahilevitz 
advocates analogizing across the public-private divide in the context of 
information privacy.199 More precisely, Strahilevitz supports courts 
analogizing to a reunified version of the common law of torts,200 in 
interpreting various aspects of information privacy law beyond the 
Fourth Amendment, such as, for example, the Freedom of Information 
Act’s (“FOIA”) privacy provisions.201 Specifically in the FOIA context, 
Strahilevitz notes that it “is natural to analogize between the common 
law invasion of privacy and the statutory ‘unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy’” language in the statute.202 Strahilevitz acknowledges 
that: 
Courts must be able to recognize when an analogy breaks down, and 
must continue to do what the common law tradition asks of them—
scrutinize precedents from peer and inferior courts carefully, follow 
them when appropriate, and reject them when their premises have 
been falsified or when their analysis does not persuade.203  
One way to look at the project of this Article is that it offers courts a 
coherent and consistent way to recognize when the analogy breaks down 
and should be rejected, or is appropriate and should be persuasive.204 
 
 197. Peter J. Courture, Independent Derivation and Reverse Engineering, in Victoria Cundiff, 
Trade Secret Protection and Litigation: Protecting Confidential Business and Technical 
Information 635 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property Course Handbook Series 
No. 340, 1992). 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 2007, 2010–11 (2010). 
 200. Id. at 2011. For an interesting discussion of his argument that the four Prosser privacy torts 
should be reunified, see id. at 2012–15. 
 201. Id. at 2014–32. 
 202. Id. at 2020. 
 203. Id. at 2037–38. 
 204. Additionally, other scholars have addressed the public-private divide in contexts unrelated to 
privacy. See, e.g., Adam Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First Amendment, 
46 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 37–43 (2013) (addressing the public-private divide in the First Amendment 
context). 
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Although all this literature makes useful and important contributions 
to various aspects of the problem, to date neither courts nor scholars have 
offered a coherent and consistent normative framework for determining 
when courts ought to analogize across the public-private divide in various 
areas of privacy law. The remainder of the Article seeks to fill that void. 
II.  Reconsidering the Public-Private Divide in Privacy Law 
This Part identifies and explores the possible justifications behind 
the traditional strict divide between the legal treatments of privacy 
violations that occur in the public sector from those that occur in the 
private sector. It begins by identifying various institutional features that 
may have historically justified distinguishing government invasions of 
privacy from private-sector invasions of privacy. For each justification, it 
then points out ways in which that traditionally governmental feature 
may now manifest itself in the private sector in the modern world. 
A. Justifications for the Public-Private Divide in Privacy Law 
The state action doctrine205 that exists throughout constitutional 
law206 means that the Constitution generally applies to governmental 
action, but not to private action. This is presumably based on an insight 
that there is something necessarily and categorically different about the 
government.207 Similarly, the public-private divide in privacy law, as a 
specific application of the state action doctrine to the Fourth 
Amendment, is presumably based on an intuition that there is something 
necessarily and categorically different about privacy violations when they 
occur by the government, as opposed to those that occur by private-
sector actors.208 For Lillian BeVier that intuition is captured in the very 
 
 205. Numerous scholars have criticized the state action doctrine. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 
19, at 503–04 (“There are still no clear principles for determining whether state action exists.”); Jody 
Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 155 (2000) (identifying the challenges with 
applying the state action doctrine). This Article does not enter that debate. Suffice it to say that the 
state action doctrine both generally, and in the privacy context, is likely here to stay. 
 206. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration 
Paradigm, 124 Yale L.J. 2994, 3035–38 (2015) (discussing the debates over whether arbitration 
misconduct can constitute state action and thus trigger the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 207. Cf. Shinar, supra note 204, at 37 (noting in the First Amendment context that the state action 
doctrine “rides on the intuition that there is something special about government”). 
 208. Daniel Solove implicitly suggests this idea when he contends that the real problem with the 
extensive collection of personal information by the private sector is the widespread information flow 
from the private sector to the government. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1133–38 (describing the 
transfer of personal information from the private sector to the government in light of the harms of the 
government having that information); see also Lillian R. BeVier, The Communications Assistance for 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994: A Surprising Sequel to the Break Up of AT&T, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 
1053 (1999) (“[O]ne must distinguish between threats to privacy that are posed by private parties and 
those that come from the government.”). 
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notion and definition of “sovereign power.”209 As she explains, “[t]he 
threats posed by government eavesdropping or electronic surveillance 
are troublesome precisely because they are posed by the government, 
that ubiquitous repository of sovereign power whose actions by definition 
have implications and consequences different in kind from those of private 
actors.”210 
There are at least four features that traditionally distinguish the 
government from private actors that could support the intuition that the 
public sector should be treated differently from the private sector with 
regard to invasions of privacy. First, the government has powers of 
coercion that were not traditionally wielded by the private sector.211 
Second, governmental invasions of privacy can harm the abilities of 
individuals to make decisions about elements of their own identities by 
causing the individual to fear governmental reprisal based on their choices.212 
In addition to the limit this can cause on individual self-determination, this 
can also impact the free and open participation in democracy.213 Third, 
the government historically had access to more sophisticated technology 
than society at large.214 Finally, the bureaucratic nature of government 
can lead to various societal and individual harms.215 
1. Government Has the Unique Power of Coercion 
First, and perhaps most significantly, society may have a different 
expectation of privacy vis-à-vis the public sector because traditionally the 
government could exercise power that exceeded the power of the private 
sector.216 This unique power results from a combination of coercion, state 
power, and the monopoly features of government. In its most extreme 
form, the traditional governmental police power involves the ability to 
take away an individual’s liberty by placing them in jail, disrupting their 
lives and homes by searching them indiscriminately, or at the extreme 
even taking their lives. As Jody Freeman put it, “[e]ven in an era marked 
by the rise of multinational corporations . . . the claim that public power 
is more menacing than private power remains unmovable as a pivot point 
in American public law.”217 
 
 209. See id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 212. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 213. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 214. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 215. See infra Part II.A.4. 
 216. See Secunda, supra note 21, at 303 (explaining that the state action doctrine is justified by the 
“power of the state in relation to the power of a private actor”). 
 217. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 588 (2000). 
Adam Shinar has made a similar point in the First Amendment context, where he points out that the 
government “is often the only source of legitimate violence, and its status as provider of public goods 
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With regard to privacy law more specifically, many scholars have 
contended that the Fourth Amendment should best be seen as protecting 
individuals from government power and coercion. For example, Paul 
Ohm has argued that “[p]ower seems to be the amendment’s essence, not 
merely a proxy for something deeper.”218 Similarly, Bill Stuntz contended 
that the Fourth Amendment should focus on coercion and violence.219 
There is also some historical support for this government power-
based justification for the public-private divide. Scholars have contended 
that the colonists designed the Fourth Amendment to respond to the 
British Crown’s practice of general warrants, which allowed them to 
search people and their homes without suspicion.220 Under this view, the 
conceptualization of the Fourth Amendment as about “security from 
unreasonable government intrusion” stems from the colonists’ experience 
with the “arbitrary exercise of [British] power to invade their property.”221 
In many ways related to this idea of government power is a fear that 
if taken to the extreme, too many governmental invasions of privacy 
could allow the government to morph into the totalitarian state captured 
in our collective imagination by the Big Brother government in George 
Orwell’s 1984.222 The Big Brother metaphor remains persuasive as one of 
the dangers of unfettered government access to information.223 A 
totalitarian government presents a source of fear due to its ability to 
“achiev[e] total domination by monitoring every facet of its citizens’ 
private lives.”224 Even in the absence of the totalitarian extreme, one 
version of the fear of government power is that the more society takes on 
totalitarian features, the greater the ability of the government to exercise 
social control over its citizens.225 
Part of the source of the government’s power is the extent to which 
the government has a monopoly in various ways. As Adam Shinar points 
 
requires an element of coercion and authority that is not found in the market.” Shinar, supra note 204, 
at 39. 
 218. Ohm, supra note 31, at 1338; see also Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The 
Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1325, 1326 (2002) 
(“The Fourth Amendment protects power not privacy. This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment 
has nothing to do with privacy—the amendment clearly addresses privacy, or more precisely, the right 
of the people to be secure. Rather, the amendment is best understood as a means of preserving the 
people’s authority over government—the people’s sovereign right to determine how and when 
government may intrude into the lives and influence the behavior of its citizens.”). 
 219. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L.J. 393, 446 
(1995). 
 220. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 
41 UCLA L. Rev. 199, 296–97 (1993). 
 221. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 
33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 307, 351–52 (1998). 
 222. See George Orwell, 1984 (1949). 
 223. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1101–02. 
 224. Id. at 1101. 
 225. See id. at 1102. 
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out, the government “is often the sole source of a particular service,” so 
there is no ability to opt out.226 Many of the government’s services, such 
as the criminal and civil justice systems, national defense, and police, 
were at least traditionally public goods for which the government had a 
monopoly.227 This is exacerbated by the fact that moving to a different 
country (or state) is challenging or sometimes impossible.228 This 
monopoly power increases the coercive nature of state power as opposed 
to private sector power where most of the time there is more choice. 
2. Government Privacy Invasions Can Harm Individual Identity 
Formulation and Democracy 
A second possible justification for traditionally treating public-
sector invasions of privacy as different in kind from private-sector 
invasions of privacy is that government privacy invasions can harm the 
ability of individuals to make identity-forming decisions about 
themselves. It can also inhibit individuals from engaging in democratic 
activities. This difference can also explain why society is prepared to 
differentiate between a reasonable expectation of privacy from the 
government versus a reasonable expectation of privacy from the private 
sector. There are various possible formulations of this justification. 
First, there is the extent to which government privacy invasions can 
harm individual identity formulation and conversely the absence of 
privacy can impede the ability of individuals to express themselves and 
otherwise form their own identities. As other scholars have previously 
recognized, Fourth Amendment rights “create the environment necessary 
for other freedoms to flourish.”229 In the absence of adequate privacy 
protection “government information-gathering can severely constrain . . . 
individual self-determination.”230 This occurs because the excessive 
government invasions of privacy regarding an individual’s activities can 
“corrupt individual decisionmaking about the elements of one’s identity” 
by causing the individual to fear governmental repercussions based on 
 
 226. Shinar, supra note 204, at 39. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 40. The challenges of moving exacerbates the government’s monopoly because 
individuals are faced with the choice between accepting the government’s various invasions of their 
privacy or moving to somewhere where their privacy would not be invaded. If moving is extremely 
difficult or impossible, that means that there is no ability to opt-out of the government’s privacy 
invasions. 
 229. Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales 
Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1173, 1241 (1988); see also Monrad 
G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police 
Sci. 255, 264 (1961) (“All the other freedoms, freedom of speech, of assembly, of religion, of political 
action, presuppose that arbitrary and capricious police action has been restrained. Security in one’s 
home and person is the fundamental without which there can be no liberty.”). 
 230. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1101–02. 
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individual choices.231 This harm to self-determination232 can occur 
unintentionally even if the government entities are not attempting to 
engage in social control or to intimidate individuals from engaging in 
certain activities.233 
Relatedly, as a subset of self-determination, government invasions 
of privacy can harm an individual’s freedom of association. The Supreme 
Court has recognized the “vital relationship between freedom to 
associate and privacy in one’s associations.”234 As a result, in the First 
Amendment context the Court has limited the government’s power to 
compel disclosure of group membership, an activity that would constitute 
an invasion of privacy, noting that “when a State attempts to make 
inquiries about a person’s beliefs or associations” such inquiries “discourage 
citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitution.”235 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of self-determination and 
interference with freedom of association is the extent to which 
government invasions of privacy can interfere with deliberative 
democracy.236 As Shinar explains, “because of their dependence on elected 
officials for resources and funding, government institutions, unlike private 
firms, are more vulnerable to the risk of being used for improper political 
purposes.”237 
A variation of this theme may help justify why many scholars 
advocate a system in which public employees should have stronger 
privacy protections from their public employer than private employees 
do from their private employees. Just as in general governmental 
invasions of privacy may harm individual decision making including 
participation in democracy in the employment context, invasions of 
privacy by the public-sector employer into the privacy of the public-
sector employee may harm the ability of the public employee to be the 
whistleblowing voice of other citizens against government waste, abuse, 
and fraud.238 On the other hand, it is also possible to make the 
diametrically opposite argument that society ought to be willing to 
recognize a lower expectation of privacy from public-sector employees 
 
 231. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1609, 1657 (1999). 
 232. Cf. David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of Self-
Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 70, 92–93 (2012) (explaining the importance of self-determination 
to individual personhood in the First Amendment context). 
 233. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1102 (noting “even if government entities are not attempting to 
engage in social control” the governmental invasions of privacy may still harm self-determination). 
 234. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
 235. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). 
 236. See Schwartz, supra note 231, at 1651–52 (arguing that inadequate protection of privacy can 
inhibit people from engaging in democratic activities). 
 237. Shinar, supra note 204, at 40. 
 238. Secunda, supra note 21, at 306–09 (noting, inter alia, that “employee privacy rights in the 
public sector are crucial so that these employees can fulfill their role of ensuring government 
transparency and accountability”). 
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than private-sector employees precisely because the public sector-
employees have special responsibilities and powers that have to be 
exercised in accordance with the public trust, such that the exercise in 
monitoring government is particularly strong. These sorts of arguments 
certainly appear relevant when considering such hot topic current issues 
as whether police officers should have to wear body cameras, a policy 
decision which necessarily invades the privacy of the police officer, but 
perhaps can be justified by the great responsibilities and powers given to 
the police. Hence, which of these arguments carries the day may depend 
in part on the particular type of governmental employee, and other 
factually specific considerations involving the degree of power given to 
the particular employee. 
Overall, however, the increased concern that privacy invasions by 
the government are more likely to harm individual self-determination as 
well as participation in democracy may help justify the public-private 
divide in how society wants to think about reasonable expectations of 
privacy across the two sectors. 
3. Government Has Access to Superior Technology 
A third justification that might distinguish reasonable expectations 
regarding government invasions of privacy from similar invasions by the 
private sector is the government’s superior capabilities with regard to 
technology. The Supreme Court has suggested that this difference 
between the public and private sector constitutes part of the justification 
for the public-private divide. In Dow Chemical Co., the Court stated in 
dictum that “[i]t may well be, as the Government concedes, that 
surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance 
equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite 
technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”239 
The Court followed similar logic in Kyllo v. United States,240 ruling that 
the government violates the Fourth Amendment when it uses technology 
that is “not in general public use” to see “details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”241 
 
 239. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). 
 240. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 241. Id. at 40; see also Nadia B. Soree, Show and Tell, Seek and Find: A Balanced Approach to 
Defining a Fourth Amendment Search and the Lessons of Rape Reform, 43 Seton Hall L. Rev. 127, 
225–26 (2013) (describing the Kyllo decision as “significant because the Court signaled its 
understanding that when police resort to extraordinary technological measures to invade privacy, with 
such means being generally available only to police, individuals fail to successfully resist the intrusion, 
both because successful resistance is not feasible in light of the superior technological capability of the 
police, and because people would not be on notice of the need to resist.”). Of course, often technology 
that is unique to government at the time later becomes available to the private sector as well. This is 
the case with the technology in Kyllo which is now available by app in the private sector. See Don 
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Various scholars have pointed out the importance of the 
government’s technological superiority to the Fourth Amendment 
framework. For example, Orin Kerr has suggested that the Fourth 
Amendment precedent, at least in the criminal context, can be seen as 
implementing a goal by courts to balance governmental advances in 
technology with advances in technology that thwart the government’s law 
enforcement aims.242 Under Kerr’s equilibrium-adjustment theory, courts 
implementing the Fourth Amendment strive to protect a technologically 
level playing field.243 Similarly, Paul Ohm agrees that “[t]hrough the 
Fourth Amendment the Framers provided a fixed ratio between police 
efficiency and individual liberty, and as technological advances change 
this ratio, judges can interpret the amendment in ways to change it 
back.”244 For Ohm, this ratio can be determined by examining the metrics 
of crime fighting such as how long investigations take.245 Thus, the 
government’s access to superior technology comprises another possible 
difference between the public and private sectors that may justify 
treating reasonable expectations of privacy across the public-private 
divide differently. 
4. Government Is Too Bureaucratic 
A fourth possible reason justifying the traditional public-private 
divide in privacy law is that government invasions of privacy are subject 
to the harms that routinely arise as an inevitable consequence of 
bureaucratic settings.246 According to Daniel Solove, the harms from 
government privacy invasions are amplified because of the bureaucratic 
nature of government that causes decisionmaking without sufficient 
accountability, the dangers that arise from “unfettered discretion,” and 
the focus on short-term goals at the expense of a long-term view of the 
world.247 
To be clear, this justification is less rooted in history than some of 
the earlier suggested justifications, as at the time of the Fourth 
Amendment, there were no organized police forces.248 Rather, it is a 
 
Clark, Smart Phone Add-Ons Offer Thermal Imaging, Wall St. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 5:13 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/smartphone-add-ons-offer-thermal-imaging-1408396425. 
 242. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 Harv. L. 
Rev. 476 (2011). 
 243. Id. at 480; see also Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on 
Technology’s Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
531 (2007). 
 244. Ohm, supra note 31, at 1346. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1104. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional 
Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19, 82 (1988). 
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more modern justification in support of the traditional public-private 
divide. In today’s modern world, law enforcement has become highly 
bureaucratized.249 Solove contends that as a result of the tremendous 
pressures on law enforcement agencies to capture criminals, solve crimes, 
prevent crime, and prevent terrorism, the bureaucracy is subject to bad 
exercises of discretion, short cuts and obliviousness.250 
Of course the bureaucratic nature of government may not be 
entirely negative. Shinar argues that the government is in fact 
deliberately “more ‘bureaucratic’ than their private sector analogues.” 
He contends that bureaucracy is the intentional limit on the powers of 
government: “[w]e the people insist that they be more constrained, that 
there be more red tape.”251 Regardless of whether these features mean 
that there is an inevitable negative side effect of bureaucracy, or its very 
purpose, the bureaucratic nature of government may justify treating the 
government differently, whether as a symptom of a problem, or because 
bureaucracy is the very remedy itself for limiting the powers of 
government. 
B. Reconsidering the Justifications for the Public-Private Divide 
Thus far this Part has explored the intuition that there is something 
necessarily and categorically different about privacy violations when they 
occur by the government, as opposed to privacy violations by the private 
sector, and has offered four possibilities for differences that at least 
traditionally distinguished the government. This next portion seeks to 
reconsider those differences, and to point out that in the modern world it 
is not always obvious that those features belong uniquely to the 
government. Rather, in today’s society252 these dangers are equally 
possible in the private sector depending on the particular circumstances. 
To be clear, the purpose of this Subpart is not to argue that the 
government and the private sectors are universally identical, or that the 
state action doctrine should be abolished. Rather, by pointing out that at 
times the private sector has come to have many of the features that 
traditionally distinguished government, this Subpart sets up the 
argument in Part III that courts should look for the presence of these 
features in deciding whether an analogy across the public-private divide 
is appropriate. 
 
 249. Solove, supra note 31, at 1106. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Shinar, supra note 204, at 40. 
 252. It is certainly possible that at the time of the Fourth Amendment that there was a categorical 
difference between the government and the private sector with regard to these dangers. I am not a 
historian, and will not weigh in on that point, but I certainly do not dispute it and am inclined to 
believe it was true. My point is about the realities of the modern world. 
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1. Private Sector Can Also Have the Power of Coercion 
The first differentiating feature considered in the justification of the 
public-private divide is that the government traditionally has unique 
power that exceeds the power of the private sector. The strongest form of 
this power occurs when the government is acting within its capacity for 
police power whereby it is capable of harming actual freedom and liberty 
and even taking the life of individuals. 
Though the police power is the strongest form of government 
coercion, certain private-sector entities also exert government-like police 
power. For example, private-sector policing groups such as security 
guards have received increased authority, and some can go so far as to 
functionally arrest or detain individuals.253 Similarly, the private sector 
exercises police-like power when government agencies hire private 
security companies to perform work that was previously carried out by 
law enforcement officers.254 Although others have contended that in 
these circumstances the state action doctrine should not bar application 
of the Fourth Amendment to the private-sector actors,255 such an extreme 
change in the doctrine is unlikely to occur. This Article suggests instead 
that courts facing such private-sector invasions of privacy that closely 
resemble police-power ought to feel free to analogize to similar cases in 
the Fourth Amendment context as persuasive authority. These analogies 
would recognize that there remain some differences between the private-
sector police power and the public-sector police power, such as the 
ability to send an individual to jail. These differences may caution against 
directly applying the Fourth Amendment, but nonetheless may support 
the use of analogies in determining the reasonable expectation of privacy 
of the individual from the coercive private-sector actor in the context of a 
private-sector case. 
Of course many types of government action do not involve the 
government police power. Nonetheless, the government has historically 
had other forms of power and coercion at its disposal, including 
economic power. In the modern world, the private sector too, however, 
has the potential for a great deal of power. As Professor Malloy has 
argued in the workplace privacy context, “the aggregation of wealth and 
power . . . has given private employers the same capacity to threaten 
privacy as the government. Thus, the threat originally seen to emanate 
just from government now arises in the commercial sector—a threat 
 
 253. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 49, 50 
(2004). 
 254. David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1177 (1999). 
 255. See generally Joh, supra note 253 (contending that this private policing trend warrants 
application of Fourth Amendment protections to situations where private-sector security guards 
engage in such police-power behavior). 
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that . . . can be just as invasive and harmful as government 
surveillance.”256 
Similarly, the private sector is not immune from the fears that 
underlie the surveillance capabilities of Big Brother. Just as the 
totalitarian government incites dread due to its ability to achieve total 
societal “domination by monitoring every facet of its citizens’ private 
lives,”257 companies like Google are capable of monitoring every aspect 
of private lives as well. And it is not always obvious that individuals have 
the right to opt-out of such private-sector monitoring. Furthermore, just 
as the government’s monopoly power can result in coercive elements 
within its services, there are numerous aspects of the private sector that 
also contain monopoly-like features. This can lead to an inability to 
entirely opt out of the system. For example, this is increasingly true in a 
difficult job market where the lack of meaningful alternatives and the 
pervasive fear of unemployment cause more dependence on the 
employer. This results in the removal of some constraints on employer 
invasions of privacy that would otherwise have existed in a more 
competitive market. 
2. Private Sector Can Also Harm Individual Identity Formulation 
and Democracy 
Just as government privacy invasions can harm individual identity 
formulation and deter individuals from engaging in democratic activities 
including whistleblowing, certain private-sector privacy invasions can 
cause similar harms. Prominent sociologist Amitai Etzioni has recounted 
the various ways in which private-sector invasions of privacy can have 
many of the same effects as violations committed by the government 
including the “‘chilling’ of expression and dissent.”258 Etzioni offers the 
examples of gays who are outed by the media, banks who call in loans of 
individuals they find out have cancer, and employers who refuse to hire 
individuals because of their political or religious views.259 All of these 
possible harms from private-sector privacy invasions can result in 
individuals hesitating to be open with and true to aspects of their 
identity. 
Similarly, social pressure from whatever source, governmental or 
private sector, can deter individuals from engaging in democratic 
activities. Think for example, of the recent CEO of Mozilla who was 
fired for engaging in a form of democratic activity, namely for making a 
 
 256. Wilborn, supra note 20 at 830. 
 257. Solove, supra note 31, at 1101. 
 258. Etzioni, supra note 31, at 934. 
 259. Id. 
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personal political donation.260 In light of that experience and many others 
like it, it seems reasonable to believe that private-sector invasions of 
privacyfrom the media, employers, social media, and so oncan 
influence individual behavior perhaps even more strongly than 
government invasions of privacy in many circumstances. This suggests that 
where a particular private-sector privacy invasion would be likely to 
impact either individual identity formation, or participation in democracy, or 
both, analogizing to similar governmental invasions of privacy would be 
more appropriate. 
3. The Private Sector Has Unprecedented Access to Technology 
Although traditionally the public-private divide in privacy law may 
have been justified by the fact that the government had access to privacy-
invading technology that was unavailable to the private sector, that 
difference has begun to break down. In the modern world many 
companies have access to the sorts of privacy-invading technologies that 
traditionally would have been exclusively in government hands. There are 
countless examples of this phenomenon. As Mary Leary has persuasively 
noted, the modern day privacy threat is not always governmental 
because “private commercial entities have introduced technologies into 
daily life which fail to afford individuals the opportunity to demonstrate 
an expectation of privacy.”261 Leary points to such examples as the 
commercially-available satellite imaging technology of Google Earth, the 
Internet tracking of personal information, and the geospatial locating of 
cell phones, all of which are not limited to the government.262 
For instance, traditionally only the government would have had 
access to satellite technology.263 Prior to the new millennium, satellite 
technology was limited to the realm of the military and intelligence 
communities.264 These days, satellite-based technologies, such as Google 
Earth, are not only available to corporations such as Google, but have 
become mainstream and available to the general public.265 
 
 260. See Tony Bradley, Backlash Against Brendan Eich Crossed a Line, Forbes (Apr. 5, 2014, 9:22 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2014/04/05/backlash-against-brendan-eich-crossed-a-line/. 
 261. Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones: Commercial Erosion of 
Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 331, 333 (2012). 
 262. Id. at 332–33. 
 263. Ricky J. Lee & Sarah L. Steele, Military Use of Satellite Communications, Remote Sensing, 
and Global Positioning Systems in the War on Terror, 79 J. Air L. & Com. 69, 71 (2014) (noting that 
“before the present millennium, military and civilian satellites were usually exclusive of each other and 
both tended to be government owned”). 
 264. Id.  
 265. See Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2321, 2344 (2007) (noting 
that satellite photos “are now much more widely available to the public, thanks to services such as 
Google Maps”). 
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Similar phenomena occur with all sorts of privacy-invading 
technologies as their use becomes more widespread in the private sector. 
Observers have noted the privacy-violating potential of such 
technological developments as Google Glasses.266 Amazon has announced 
plans to make use of drones.267 Additionally, the use of biometric technology 
and GPS tracking is widespread in the private sector from employers to 
other private companies.268 As a result, the government no longer has 
unfettered access to superior technology that is unavailable in other 
sectors. As such, courts can no longer automatically rely on governmental 
technological superiority to justify treating governmental invasions of 
privacy entirely differently from private-sector invasions of privacy. 
Rather, courts ought to consider the technological prowess of a particular 
private sector privacy-invading actor in deciding whether to analogize to 
an equally technologically advanced public-sector Fourth Amendment 
case. 
4. Private Sector Can Also Be Extremely Bureaucratic 
As for the final justification for the public-private divide in privacy 
law, the harms that can occur as a result of the bureaucratic nature of 
government, the very same sort of bureaucratic-driven harms can also 
take place in the private sector. Scholars have recognized that the private 
sector often resembles the sort of bureaucracy typically used to describe 
the government. For example, in his influential 1984 Harvard Law 
Review article, Gerald Frug contends that corporations and government 
agencies share “characteristics that have traditionally identified 
‘bureaucracy’ as a form of social organization.”269 Many scholars since 
have also noted the bureaucratic features of the private sector.270 In the 
privacy context, Solove observes that in the private-sector information is 
 
 266. Kashmir Hill, How Google Glasses Make a Persistent, Pervasive Surveillance State Inevitable, 
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 268. See generally Elizabeth M. Walker, Note, Biometric Boom: How the Private Sector 
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(discussing the increased use of biometric technologies in the private sector); see also Laura 
Silverstein, The Double Edged Sword: An Examination of the Global Positioning System, Enhanced 
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Abusers, 13 Buff. Women’s L.J. 97, 103 (2005) (noting that GPS has shifted from solely a military 
instrument to a common tool in the private sector). 
 269. Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276, 1278 
(1984). 
 270. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. 
Corp. L. 657, 661 (1996) (acknowledging that the traditional view of “the corporation as a bureaucratic 
hierarchy is largely correct”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational 
Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 1313, 1357 (2005). 
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often held not by trusted friends or family members, but by “large 
bureaucracies that we do not know very well or sometimes do not even 
know at all.”271 
Unsurprisingly then, the very harms associated with the 
bureaucratic features of government are also common critiques in the 
private sector. Above all, the private sector has often been criticized for 
its lack of accountability.272 Frug contends that “corporate bureaucratic 
power, as it has emerged, has imposed a forceful objective restraint on 
the shareholders’ ability to govern the corporation.”273 Thus corporate 
bureaucratic power limits accountability to the shareholders. In the 
privacy context, Solove has illustrated the lack of accountability by 
corporations in collecting data.274 Many have criticized corporations for 
“unfettered discretion.”275 
Finally, the critique of government bureaucracies as making choices 
based on short-term goals without consideration of the long-term 
consequences of the larger social effects is also an extremely common 
problem in the private sector.276 Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court 
of Chancery, Leo Strine Jr. has extensively discussed the problems with 
corporations being managed for the short-term at the expense of the 
long-term.277 Scholars have also extensively documented this potentially 
harmful phenomenon.278 For example, a number of scholars have offered 
 
 271. Solove, supra note 31, at 1095. 
 272. Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation, 80 Marq. L. Rev. 391, 464 (1997) 
(describing the standard critique of classic liberalism with respect to the corporation as failing to 
account for private power which is “the hierarchical authority of management and is thought, by the 
terms of the critique, to be unaccountable, unconstrained or arbitrary”). For the classic account of the 
absence of accountability, see Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property (Harcourt, Brace, and World rev. ed. 1967) (1932). 
 273. Frug, supra note 269, at 1306. 
 274. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, 1429 (2001). 
 275. Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: 
A Comparative Analysis, 7 Hastings Bus. L.J. 309, 328 (2011) (“Corporations became entities of 
immense economic and political power that afford boards of directors and corporate executives 
largely unfettered discretion to govern as they see fit, subject only to market pressures and the 
agitations of activist shareholders.”); see also Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How 
Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public 110 (2012) (“[F]or 
most of the twentieth century directors of public companies who did not breach their loyalty duties 
enjoyed virtually unfettered discretion to set corporate policy.”). 
 276. See generally Robert Anderson IV, The Long and Short of Corporate Governance, 23 Geo. 
Mason L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (criticizing the emphasis on short-term shareholders in explaining 
the short-term governance phenomenon). 
 277. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think 
Long Term?, 66 Bus. Law. 1, 10–11 (2010) (explaining that because “institutional investors often have 
a myopic concern for short-term performance,” managers have “little reason to think deeply about the 
effect of corporate governance proposals on long-term corporate performance”). 
 278. See, e.g., Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism and Managerial Myopia, 
100 Ky. L.J. 531, 531 (2011) (“Short-termism denotes the phenomenon by which some corporate 
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this so-called “short-termism” as an explanation for what occurred with 
the collapse of Enron.279 This bureaucracy-like focus on short-term goals 
at the expense of long-term goals causes the private sector to often have 
the same problematic relationship to privacy invasions as its public sector 
government counterpart. Overall, many aspects of the private sector 
resemble precisely the sort of bureaucracy that epitomizes government. 
As such, courts ought to consider the presence of such bureaucratic 
characteristics, and the resulting privacy concerns that come along with 
them, in deciding whether to analogize between the public and private 
sectors. 
III.  A Normative Framework for Privacy Analogies 
This Article is about overcoming the public-private divide for the 
purpose of privacy analogies. The important normative question that 
courts and scholars continue to evade is whether it is appropriate for a 
court analyzing the reasonable expectation of privacy portion of a Fourth 
Amendment case to consider the fact that in a private-sector case a court 
has protected the plaintiff against precisely the sort of privacy invasion 
the government committed.280 Or in reverse, whether it is appropriate for 
a court engaging in a doctrinally similar analysis in a private-sector 
privacy case to take into account a judicial decision from a Fourth 
Amendment case in which a court has held that a factually similar 
privacy invasion violated a defendant’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
This Part builds on Part II by suggesting that courts deciding 
whether to analogize across the public-private divide should consider the 
applicability of the differentiating features identified in Part II that 
traditionally distinguished governmental invasions of privacy. This 
multifactored analysis should then inform the currently haphazard 
question of whether the analogy is appropriate. 
 
managers, responding to pressure from investors or acting to bolster their own position, advert their 
attention and exert their energies to achieving short-term profitability, virtually eschewing longer-term 
considerations. . . . Short-termism promotes a tendency to overvalue short-term rewards, invariably 
leading to an undervaluation of long term consequences.”). 
 279. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 
1275, 1283 (2002) (explaining the collapse of Enron in terms of short-term decisionmaking); Jill E. 
Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. Corp. L. 637, 
673 (2006). 
 280. Cf. Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 Geo. L.J. 1, 29–32 (2013) 
(arguing that courts considering Fourth Amendment cases ought to consider wider information 
contained in statistical data, clinical evidence, and experience, rather than only intuition and common 
sense). 
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A. The Normative Framework in the Abstract 
Courts should consider whether the specific governmental actor in 
the public-sector privacy case that is subject to the potential analogy 
exhibits the four features traditionally differentiating government. 
Courts should ask themselves: First, did the government in this situation 
exercise uniquely governmental coercion or hold monopoly power? 
Second, did the government in this case act in such a way that its invasion 
of privacy is likely to harm individual self-determination and/or 
democratic participation? Third, did the government invade privacy by 
using sophisticated technology that exists solely in the hands of the 
government? Finally, does the privacy-invading governmental actor 
suffer from the various bureaucratic features—namely lack of 
accountability, unfettered discretion, and a short-term focus—that can 
cause invasions of privacy to be particularly harmful?281 
Courts should then also consider whether the particular privacy-
invading actor in the private-sector privacy case that is subject to the 
potential analogy also exhibits those four features to a similar extent to 
the governmental actor. Did the private-sector actor exercise a similar 
degree of power and coercion to the government? Is this particular form 
of private-sector invasion of privacy likely to harm individual self-
determination and democratic participation in a way that is comparable 
to the form of privacy invasion exercised by the government? Did the 
private-sector actor use a similar technological advantage to that used by 
the government? And finally, does the particular type of private actor at 
issue share similar bureaucratic features with their accompanying harms 
to its public-sector counterpart? 
After asking these questions and comparing the two cases along 
these four factors, courts can make a better informed decision as to 
whether this is an appropriate case for analogizing across the public-
private divide for the purpose of deciding the reasonable expectation of 
privacy analysis or its doctrinal equivalent. Should the factors be 
sufficiently comparable, then analogizing is appropriate. Should the 
factors be sufficiently different, then courts ought to proceed carefully 
before deciding to analogize across the public-private divide. As with 
many multifactored tests, a concept courts are quite familiar with, no 
single factor is dispositive, nor is this a purely quantitative question. 
Instead, these factors offer a framework for what sorts of questions 
courts ought to consider when deciding whether analogizing across the 
public-private divide is appropriate in a privacy law context. 
To be sure, particularly in the context of evaluating reasonable 
expectations of privacy, courts need to be careful to keep in mind the 
role of both floors and ceilings in conducting the analysis. For example, 
 
 281. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1104. 
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assume that a certain private-sector case finds that an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from the private sector. Then assume 
that a second court faces a factually similar case, except that now it is the 
government, which is invading the individual’s privacy. The second court 
applies the multifactored normative framework suggested above and 
concludes that the governmental actor has considerably more of the 
traditional factors than the private sector. This would suggest that the 
individual ought to have a higher expectation of privacy from the 
government than from the private sector. In such a circumstance, 
analogizing might still be appropriate because the private-sector case 
could constitute a floor for the court to consider. In other words, the 
court could conclude that the public ought to have a higher expectation 
of privacy from the governmental actor than from a private-sector actor. 
The private sector finding remains relevant, however, to show the court 
that at the very least the public has a certain level of protection of 
privacy from the private sector, such that the level of protection of 
privacy from the government must exceed that floor. 
Now assume instead that a judicial decision in a private-sector case 
finds that the plaintiff does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
from the private-sector actor in that case. A second court considers a 
factually similar case, only now it is the government, which is invading 
the individual’s privacy. The court engages in the multifactored 
normative framework and concludes that the governmental actor has 
more of the traditional factors than the private sector. This once again 
suggests that the individual has a higher expectation of privacy from the 
government than from a private-sector actor. In such a circumstance, the 
fact that the earlier case found that the individual did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from the private-sector actor does not 
tell the second court much because the factors indicate that the 
individual ought to receive a higher expectation of privacy from the 
government than from the private sector. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the reasonable expectation 
of privacy analysis is often not outcome determinative of the entire case. 
It is plausible that a court may engage in the multifactored normative 
analysis described above to determine that a particular plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The reasonable expectation of privacy 
analysis is merely one part of the Fourth Amendment analysis. The court 
might still determine that despite the fact that the plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, that the government’s reason for 
invading that privacy nonetheless justifies the intrusion. This difference 
in the rationale for the privacy intrusion might justify a different ultimate 
outcome in a public-sector case than in a private-sector case, even where 
there is a similar reasonable expectation of privacy. The court should be 
able to reach a different outcome in the cases while still acknowledging 
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that the reasonable expectation of privacy portion of the analysis is 
comparable. 
B. The Normative Framework Applied to a Hypothetical 
To better understand how this normative framework would work in 
practice, this Subpart will walk through how a court would approach 
analogizing across the public-private divide in the context of a hypothetical 
scenario. Assume that the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
is investigating potential insider trading and other securities violations at 
a medium-sized hedge fund. Traditional investigatory techniques, such as 
obtaining a warrant for the company’s documents, might tip off 
individuals inside the company. So instead, the SEC decides to hire a 
computer systems expert and/or hacker to determine whether there was 
any information available from the hedge fund’s computer systems that 
could be obtained by someone who knew what they were looking for, but 
without violating any laws. The SEC pays the hacker to hack into the 
hedge fund’s computers and to investigate any wrongdoing. Although the 
hacker, despite being extremely good at what he does, is unable to gain 
access to the fund’s e-mails, he is able to exploit exposures in the hedge 
fund’s various firewalls to obtain information about all the hedge fund’s 
trades for the SEC. Later, when the SEC brings a civil enforcement 
action against individuals at the hedge fund for violations of securities 
laws, a Fourth Amendment claim is raised based on how the SEC 
obtained its information. 
In analyzing the Fourth Amendment claim, one of the questions the 
court considers is whether the hedge fund had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in its trades. The government argues that the mere fact that 
the computer expert was able to get into the hedge fund’s system 
suggests that the fund could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
because many computer experts could have gotten in. The government 
also argues that the hedge fund failed to hire a cybersecurity firm, which 
many hedge funds have hired to protect themselves. By not hiring such a 
firm, the government argues, the hedge fund should have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
In response, the hedge fund points to a similar case in the trade 
secret context. In that case, a computer hacker was found liable for trade 
secret violations under the applicable state trade secret law, for similarly 
exploiting weaknesses in the computer security of a hedge fund in order 
to obtain trading secrets.282 In the trade secret case the hedge fund had 
also used a firewall and other protections, but had not hired a 
 
 282. This hypothetical is very loosely based on actual events that recently took place in the private 
sector. See Myles Udland, A Hedge Fund Was Hacked in a Never-Before-Seen Attack, Bus. Insider 
(June 19, 2014, 9:43AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/hedge-fund-hacked-in-complex-attack-2014-6. 
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cybersecurity firm. Nonetheless, in the context of the trade secret case, 
the court found that the hedge fund’s trade strategy was a “trade secret” 
under the UTSA meaning that it “is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”283 In 
deciding whether to analogize to the trade secret case, or even consider it 
as persuasive (clearly not binding) in determining whether a hedge fund 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information that can be 
obtained by a computer hacker, the court ought to begin by engaging in 
the multifactored normative framework. 
First, the court should consider the power of coercion of the 
government versus the private party in the two cases under consideration. 
In this hypothetical, the government actor at issue is the SEC. Although 
the securities laws prohibit conduct both criminally and civilly, the SEC 
is only responsible for civil enforcement and administrative actions. In a 
civil enforcement action, the SEC can obtain a court order enjoining an 
individual from further violations of securities laws, disgorgement of any 
money obtained from the illegal conduct, and in some circumstances 
impose civil penalties. Importantly, the SEC may not engage in criminal 
enforcement of the federal securities laws, although they can provide 
assistance to the U.S. Attorney and U.S. Department of Justice to do so. 
Therefore, although the SEC has a good deal of power of coercion in its 
civil enforcement role, that power of coercion is not significantly greater 
than the power of coercion a hacker has when stealing trade secrets. The 
hacker can also coerce the hedge fund to pay large amounts of money, or 
if they do not do so can impose a tremendous financial cost on the hedge 
fund. Significantly, neither the SEC nor the civil-sector hacker can put 
anyone in jail. If the hypothetical were modified such that the Fourth 
Amendment claim were being brought in the context of a criminal trial 
brought by the U.S. Attorney or U.S. Department of Justice, then the 
power of coercion factor would look very different because the 
government would be acting at the peak of its power of coercion, thus 
suggesting that higher levels of protection should be granted vis-à-vis the 
government. Under the existing hypothetical, however, the power of 
coercion in both sectors is primarily economic in nature, and therefore 
the public and private sectors are relatively comparable for this first 
factor. 
Next, for the second factor, the court should consider the impact of 
each party’s privacy invasion on individual self-determination. The target 
of both of these privacy invasions is a hedge fund, but corporations can 
have privacy interests by virtue of the individuals that make up those 
corporations.284 Therefore, a court needs to consider whether the 
 
 283. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985). 
 284. Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 27, 59–64 (2014). 
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individuals who make up the hedge fund are likely to have their 
individual self-determination impacted as a result of the privacy invasion 
by either the public-sector or private-sector hacker. Both the public-
sector hacker and the private-sector hacker obtained information about 
the hedge fund’s trades, and not personal information about employees. 
Had the information hacked included such information as employee 
personnel files, e-mails and so on, the privacy invasion may have had 
more impact on individual self-determination. Under the existing 
hypothetical, however, the second factor does not really come into play, 
as there is likely minimal impact on individual self-determination from 
this type of privacy invasion. 
Third, the court should consider the extent to which the government 
privacy invasion benefitted from access to superior technology. In this 
hypothetical it did not. The government hired a computer hacker, just 
like in the trade secret case. Had the government made use of uniquely 
government resources, such as NSA databases, or some sort of military-
only cryptography, this factor would suggest great protection from the 
government than the private sector. As the hypothetical currently stands, 
this technological advantage factor is comparable for both the public and 
private-sector privacy invasions. 
Finally, the fourth factor requires the court to evaluate the extent to 
which each of the parties contains the sorts of bureaucratic 
characteristics that can cause difficulties with privacy invasions. This 
factor differs between the public and private sectors in this hypothetical. 
The privacy-invading party in the government context, the SEC, is very 
much the epitome of a government bureaucracy. The SEC has five 
divisions and eleven regional offices throughout the United States. In 
addition, the SEC has a number of substantive offices.285 Considering 
how many offices and branches they have, the SEC is subject to precisely 
the sorts of privacy concerns that exist whenever there are features of a 
bureaucracy. By contrast, the court in the hypothetical does not 
necessarily have information about who hired the hacker in the trade 
secret case. Therefore, there is no reason to necessarily believe that the 
trade secret case features the same sort of bureaucratic features as the 
SEC. Hence, this last feature suggests that a hedge fund should have a 
greater expectation of privacy from the bureaucratic government than 
from the private sector. 
 
 285. These include the Office of General Counsel; the Office of the Chief Accountant; the Office 
of Compliance, Inspections and Examinations; the Office of International Affairs; the Office of Investor 
Education and Advocacy; the Office of Economic Analysis; the Office of Information Technology, the 
Inspector General, who has a staff of twenty-two; and the SEC Office of the Whistleblower. SEC 
Divisions Homepages, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/divisions.shtml (last visited Dec. 
18, 2015).  
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Putting all of the factors together, the court will conclude in this 
particular hypothetical that the hedge fund should have at least the same 
if not more of an expectation of privacy from the government than from 
the private sector. Therefore, to the extent that the trade secret case 
suggests that society has recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in a hedge fund’s trading information even if the fund did not hire a 
cybersecurity company, the court should feel comfortable analogizing to 
the trade secret case. Once again this intermediate conclusion with 
respect to analogizing for the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis 
does not necessarily mean that the two cases should ultimately have the 
same result. The court may determine that the fund has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in its trading information, but that the 
government’s rationale for engaging in this privacy violation justifies the 
privacy intrusion in a balancing analysis in a way that the private sector’s 
corporate espionage justification would not. 
Now for purposes of thoroughly understanding the multifactored 
normative framework, assume that the hypothetical changes such that 
the analogizing is happening in reverse. Under the new hypothetical, a 
court considering a trade secret case is trying to decide whether the 
trading information is in fact a trade secret, which turns on whether the 
hedge fund took steps that “are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.” The court is considering analogizing to a Fourth 
Amendment case with the same facts as above, in which a court found 
that there was a Fourth Amendment violation and thus necessarily that 
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court should first 
consider each of the four factors precisely as above. This time, however, 
the fact that the factors suggest that society might want to give an 
individual more of an expectation of privacy from the government than 
from the private sector as a result of the government’s bureaucratic 
features means that an analogy would likely be inappropriate. Because 
the factors suggest that there should be more privacy protection from the 
government, the fact that the company received privacy protection from 
the government, does not help guide the court as to whether the 
company should also receive privacy protection vis-à-vis the private-
sector hacker. A similar process would occur in any situation in which 
the court was considering analogizing across the public-private divide, 
whether in workplace privacy, trade secrets, or any other context. 
Conclusion 
Various areas of privacy law contain doctrinal similarities, including 
some version of consideration of an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The existence of the state action doctrine means that courts may 
not entirely conflate private-sector privacy cases with public-sector 
Fourth Amendment cases. Nonetheless, given the doctrinal similarities, 
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there are various situations in which courts naturally consider analogies 
between the public and the private sector case law to make sense and be 
appropriate. 
Until now, courts have not had a coherent or consistent normative 
framework for deciding whether to apply such analogies across various 
privacy law scenarios. In the absence of such a framework, courts seem 
to draw analogies in a haphazard manner and without any discussion of 
whether and why the analogy makes sense or does not make sense in a 
particular case. The multifactored normative framework presented in 
this Article represents a starting point to move beyond that seemingly 
random and unarticulated system. Moving forward, courts considering 
analogizing between public-sector and private-sector privacy cases ought 
to evaluate the presence of power and coercion, the impact on self-
identity and democratic participation, the existence of any technological 
advantages, and the bureaucratic features of the corresponding privacy-
invading powers in both cases. Or, in other words, courts ought to start 
looking at when corporations behave like the state because they take on 
features that resemble those of the state. 
It is certainly possible that courts and scholars may identify other 
differences not articulated here between the public and private sectors 
that would suggest that courts ought to not analogize across the public-
private divide when that difference is present. I welcome such additions 
and debates. As long as courts and scholars are applying a coherent and 
consistent normative framework and articulating the reasons they believe 
privacy analogies are or are not appropriate in a particular context, it 
would be a substantial improvement over the status quo. 
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